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PART

NEQ 3/548/1

FILE No. NEQ 3/548/1 (Part A) (1-51)

TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ

REFER TO

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RECEIVED REGISTRY 27 JAN 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

2/1

His Excellency
Mr A J Wilton MC
British Embassy
KUWAIT

BRITISH EMBASSY IPC's

BAGHDAD

The real reason (1)
for this canard is
unexpectedly Trarivul
with the Baath,
20 January 1971 plus the £20m.
Donceur of September,
M. Giscard d'Estaing 28/1

M. Mithy 24/1
Miss Beckett
M. A. 28/1

K 2/2

FUTURE OF THE GULF SHEIKHDOMS AND ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

1. The allegation made by your Saudi colleague that we have chosen Iraq to be our successor in the Gulf is a quite extraordinary canard. So far as I am aware, it has no basis of truth whatsoever.
2. In seeking an explanation, I can only attribute this odd remark to a combination of the now fairly widespread impression that it is we who are supporting the Ba'athist régime in Baghdad and of Iraqi explanations, perhaps to the Saudis, about their overt policy in the Gulf. In this connexion it is relevant that I was told last week by Abdul Hussain al Jamali, Director General of the Arab Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Iraqis have no quarrel with our general Gulf policy at present. In fact, he said, they definitely approve of the policy we have tried to follow in bringing about a union of the Nine, and "are satisfied" about our attitude over the legal position of the islands (see my letter 2/1 of 16 January to Bill Luce).
3. As regards the general charge that we are "thick" with the Ba'athist Government in Baghdad, this could have several explanations:-
 - a. it could be a deliberate piece of "disinformation" put around by the UAR and/or the Russians for their own purposes;
 - b. pre-western or pre-British statements may have been made in private by some members of the Ba'athist régime and thus given Arab diplomats, as well as some Iraqis, the impression that we are actually supporting the Ba'ath. No government in Baghdad is credited with any power of survival unless it has some external support;
 - c. a combination of b. above and the inference that, since our exports to Iraq have been quietly rising, there must be some understanding between the UK and the Baghdad Ba'athists (paragraph 2 of your letter).

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4. It is true that we have made some headway in Iraq at the expense of the US and the Germans since goods from those countries are "banned" for political reasons (in practice a considerable quantity seem to find their way through the net). It is also true that British goods are especially highly regarded in Iraq and we are still Iraq's leading supplier (our exports rose to £21.8 million up to the end of November in 1970). All these elements, however, scarcely seem sufficiently substantial for your Saudi colleague to have woven the fairy tale which he has.

D F Hawley

cc **His Excellency
Mr W Morris CMG
JEDDA**

**Mr A A Acland
Arabian Department
FCO**

IMMEDIATE

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Top copy on Spare NEQ 10/4

(W2)

FM KUWAIT 270925Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 45 OF 27 JANUARY INFO PRIORITY TO BAGHDAD
ROUTINE JEDDA BAHRAIN RESIDENCY TEHRAN AND AMMAN

YOUR TEL NO 31:-

SEA KING HELICOPTERS FOR IRAQ.

THE SUPPLY OF THESE HELICOPTERS TO IRAQ, PARTICULARLY AS MANY AS 50 AND PARTICULARLY IF FITTED WITH ARMS LIKE THOSE QUOTED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 3, WOULD MAKE IT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE KUWAIT ARMED FORCES TO HOLD A DETERMINED IRAQI ATTACK ON THIS COUNTRY FOR ANY APPRECIABLE TIME. ALTHOUGH THE KUWAITIS WOULD MAKE NO OFFICIAL PROTEST IF THEY BECAME AWARE OF SUCH A SALE, SINCE OFFICIALLY THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ ARE SUPPOSED TO BE CORDIAL., REACTIONS IN PRIVATE MIGHT WELL BE STRONG.

2. THE VIEW IS WIDELY AND FIRMLY HELD HERE THAT H M G HAVE FORMED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BA'ATH GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ WITH THE INTENTION OF LEAVING THE IRAQIS IN CONTROL OF THE GULF AND USING THEM AS OUR CHOSEN INSTRUMENTS OF INFLUENCE AFTER OUR DEPARTURE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS TAXED US WITH THIS AND GENERAL MUBARAK PUT THIS VIEW TO ME ON 25 JANUARY. NEWS OF A SALE OF THIS KIND WOULD CONFIRM THESE SUSPICIONS.

3. IT WOULD ALSO INCREASE KUWAITI IRRITATION AT OUR INABILITY TO MEET THEIR UNREASONABLE DEMANDS OVER SUCH WEAPONS AS HUNTER AIRCRAFT AND WOMBAT. THEY WOULD CERTAINLY REFUSE TO SEE THE MATTER AS A SIMPLE EXERCISE IN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY.

4. TO MEET THE IRAQI REQUEST WOULD THEREFORE BE BOUND TO MAKE OUR RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT MORE UNEASY. THIS WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO AFFECT OUR PRINCIPAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS HERE UNLESS, OF COURSE, IT ENCOURAGED THE IRAQIS TO INVADE. I SHOULD NOT WISH TO OPPOSE SUPPLY UNLESS THE REPLY OF BAGHDAD TO YOUR PARAGRAPH 5 IS ALARMING. I HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT EVERY EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO KEEP THE SALE CONFIDENTIAL FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, AND AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF THIS YEAR, WHILE WE NEED KUWAITI DIPLOMATIC ASSISTANCE IN THE LOWER GULF.

WILTON

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MR SHEEN EIR MAS

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FROM KUWAIT. 020745Z

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY - 3 FEB 1971 NEQ 3/548/1
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 56 OF 2 FEBRUARY INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD

MY TELEGRAM NO. 45, PARAGRAPH 2:-
ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS.

1. ON 31 JANUARY WHEN TALKING TO A MEMBER OF MY STAFF MAJOR-GENERAL MUBARAK AGAIN REVERTED TO THE THEME OF BRITISH/BA-ATH COLLUSION. IN PARTICULAR HE SAID THAT THE IRAQI C I G S WAS CURRENTLY IN LONDON AND HE ASKED WHAT WAS ON HIS SHOPPING LIST. HE ASSERTED THAT FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING TO BUY BRITISH BOMBERS.
2. GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION (NOT NECESSARILY FOR TRANSMISSION TO KUWAITIS) ON CURRENT IRAQI ARMS ENQUIRIES. ARE HUNTERS RATHER THAN BOMBERS IN QUESTION ?

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Mr. Beggs

NED have
replied. Dmfr
cleared with
us 3 1/2

Presumably NED
will reply. But
we had better
see in draft.

filed
3 1/2

(3)

F.C.O. 041750Z

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TO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT TELEGRAM NO. 42 OF 4 FEBRUARY INFO BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 56: ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

(2)

1. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THE ITEMS ON THE PURPORTED IRAQI SHOPPING LIST (WHICH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HAVE STILL NOT HAD IN WRITING FROM GENERAL SHIHAB) INCLUDE JAGUAR, DAC 167, MORTAR LOCATING RADAR AND SOME ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT IN ADDITION TO SEA KING HELICOPTERS (MY TELEGRAM NO. 31).
2. WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE THAT THERE CAN BE NO (REPEAT NO) QUESTION OF LETTING THE IRAQIS HAVE JAGUAR, UNTIL THE LATE 1970S AT LEAST, INTER ALIA FOR SECURITY REASONS. THE OTHER ITEMS THEY WANT ARE LESS SENSITIVE. THEY HAVE MADE NO REPEAT NO MENTION OF BOMBERS, AND WE OURSELVES ARE NOT KEEN TO REVIVE THE QUESTION OF THE SIXTEEN HUNTERS ON OFFER LAST SUMMER. IF AND WHEN ANY DEAL IS CONCLUDED WITH THE IRAQIS ON ANY PARTICULAR ITEM, E.G. SEA KINGS, WE SHALL CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE TO INFORM THE KUWAITIS IN CONFIDENCE OF THE IMPENDING SALE.
3. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU AND YOUR STAFF COULD REBUT WITH ALL THE ELOQUENCE AT YOUR COMMAND KUWAITI ASSERTIONS ABOUT U.K./BAATH COLLUSION. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO (REPEAT NO) EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE THEORY, SINCE THE MODEST RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE I.P.C. AND THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT, ON WHICH THE CANARD MIGHT HAVE BEEN BASED, HAS NOT EVEN LED TO ANY IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF A SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES. PLEASE TAKE A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY OF PUTTING THIS TO GENERAL MUBARAK, WITH THE GLOSS THAT IN DECIDING ON ANY PARTICULAR SALE OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ, WE WILL OF COURSE NOT NEGLECT THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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British Embassy

BAGHDAD

3/4

5 February 1971

Spoken to Miss Beckett.

R M Evans Esq
Near Eastern Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

Enter w/ letter

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 19 FEB 1971 NEQ 3/548/1
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13/2 8 19/2

Dear Richard,

ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS

1. One of the features of the rivers which meander across the muddy plains of Iraq is that they change direction from time to time and sometimes revert to their original course. There are now some indications in the political sphere that the water may be beginning to trickle back into the old channel: the Iraqis are once again tending to turn towards us in a number of spheres - military, medical, consultancy and commercial.

⑧ NEQ 10/1

2. In my despatch 10/2 of 16 January on the 50th Anniversary of the Iraqi Army, I described the warm welcome which our modest delegation received. Both Brigadier Purdon and Air Commodore Robertson were, I think, struck by the genuinely friendly attitude of all the Iraqi officers they met and by the earnestness with which senior officers pleaded for a more forthcoming attitude over courses in the UK in order to maintain previously existing links. This undoubtedly reflects a strong body of influential opinion in the Iraqi Army and Air Force, particularly as many officers feel that they have become over-dependent on the USSR. The attitude of the Iraqis on this occasion went well beyond the bounds of normal Arab politeness and the visit of the Iraqi Minister of Defence to the UK so soon after the celebrations has undoubtedly significance. I have not yet heard how this visit has gone but, whether it went well or badly, I am convinced that there is a genuine desire in the Iraqi armed forces to reforge links with us. What is more serving officers are particularly less inhibited from associating with us now: for instance, the turn-out at the Attachés' social functions recently has been markedly higher than at any time since 1967. (There are, of course, dangers in this for us if the hopes of the Iraqis are dashed.)

3. Things have moved dramatically fast in the medical sphere. My telegram No 20 of 8 January 1971 announced the arrival in the UK of the President of Baghdad university and the private doctor of President Bakr to make high level contacts with the British medical profession. This brief visit was remarkably successful and resulted

② NEQ 9/1

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in:-

- a. The Royal College of Physicians agreeing to send 5 or 6 visiting professors to lecture at Baghdad University in the current year.
- b. The Board of Examiners agreeing to resume the arrangements for providing examiners which existed up to 1967.

4. These developments followed the successful visit of Dr Nicholas Martin at the end of last year when, following a useful visit sponsored by the British Council, he came out here again at the invitation of the Minister of Higher Education. The first of the visiting professors - Dr Oakley, the diabetician - spent a few days here last week. Apart from seeing President Bakr, he gave 3 lectures in the University which were very well attended and warmly applauded. He commented that he would encourage his medical friends to visit Baghdad: those who did not do so "were missing something".

5. I wrote in my letter 3/3 of 9 November 1970 to Hilary Sinclair in the DTI about increased possibilities for British consultants in Iraq in certain spheres. There have been a few developments. First the Dairy Administration are very keen on the Milk Marketing Board acting as consultants for them in their expansion plans and this could have considerable possibilities for British exports (my tel no CREDA 13 of 21 January. Gibb, Ewbank and certain other British consultants have been approached by OPCA about consultancy for a petro-chemical industry in Iraq and certain other projects.

6. In addition to this a new link has been established between the Building Research Station at Watford and the Building Research Centre in Baghdad run by UNDP. This project has in the past been dependent to a considerable extent on Indian expertise. But the Yugoslav in charge of it, with the active encouragement of the Iraqis involved, considered it desirable to turn to the British Building Research Station. This led to a visit this month by Mr A Pickles, who is in charge of the Overseas Division, and Mr Dalby, who came on a short visit as a visiting UN expert to advise on building regulations. Both were impressed not only with the reception which they received from the Iraqis, but also with the standard of the Iraqi organisation (Pickles rated it as good as Pakistan's and Ghana's and infinitely better than Jamaica's). It has now been agreed that 5 or 6 experts in various fields will come out from the Building Research Station in the current year under UNDP auspices and likewise the Building Research Centre will receive Iraqi visitors.

7. Another sphere in which matters have improved for us is in civil aviation. A British ICAO representative has been giving advice to the Iraqis and this advice has now been taken, those who challenged him having fallen by the wayside.

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1965
figure
was £25m!

8. You already know, I think, how things have been going on the Commercial side. With a bit of luck our exports to Iraq in 1970 will top the £24 million figure, an increase of some £10 million in 2 years. The Birmingham Chamber of Commerce visited us from 22 to 28 January. The Chamber was very well received and was entertained to lunch by the Iraq Federation of Industries and to dinner by the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce - an exceptionally well-attended occasion to which virtually all the Directors General in the public sector companies came. The desire on the part of Iraq to do business with the UK was impressed on the leader of the Mission by the Minister of Industry and also by the Under Secretary in the Ministry of Economy in the absence of the Minister himself. We calculate that immediate orders worth £50,000 have been placed with a good prospect of a further £150,000 very soon. Furthermore all but one of the members of the mission announced their intention to come back to Baghdad to chase further business which they see in prospect.

9. I do not suggest that all this amounts to anything to become wildly excited about. Two or three swallows do not make a summer. However I am sure you will agree that they are welcome developments, which provide further evidence that Iraq is not so far gone along the "socialist" road as to be beyond the pale.

John E. ...

Donald Hawley

D F Hawley

cc H B McKenzie Johnston Esq
ODM

B E Bellamy Esq
DTI

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1. Miss Beckett. (5)

A. prepare a dft

British Embassy

BAGHDAD *reply in concert with*

Mr Beaven (Arabia)
13 February 1971

*I wd. be inclined
to omit § 4(d) in
any reasoned rebuttal
of Kuwaiti criticism, for
the reason given in the
margin.*

19/2

3/4

R M Evans Esq
Near Eastern Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

Dear Richard,

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

3

2. Enter.

1. In paragraph 3 of FCO telegram No 42 to Kuwait, you suggested that the canard about a special relationship between HMG and the Iraqi Ba'ath was due to the modest improvement in relations between IPC and the Iraqi government.

2. I agree, of course, that the loan made by IPC and the other measures taken by the Company in October greatly improved the atmosphere here and it was one of the principal considerations I had in mind when referring in my letter 2/1 of 20 January 1971 to John Wilton and copied to Anthony Acland to "the now fairly widespread impression that it is we who are supporting the Ba'athist régime". However, I should perhaps remind you that this particular duck is rather longer in the bill. You may like to refer to my letter 3/13 of 29 August 1970 to Peter Tripp which shows that it was alive and strong even at that time. Still further back it was even mentioned in paragraph 13 of my despatch NEQ 3/548/1 of 5 September 1969.

(18) NEQ 3/541/1
(1970)

3. It seems to me that the only hard evidence to which the Kuwaitis might point is:-

a. The modest improvement in relations between IPC and the Iraqi government to which you have referred.

b. Our improved trade figures with Iraq.

c. The matters referred to in paragraphs 3-8 of my letter 3/4 to you of 5 February 1971 (I am now sending a copy of this to John Wilton).

d. The knowledge that the Iraqis have been shopping for arms.

4. I, of course, agree that the canard is absurd and should have its throat cut as quickly as possible. May I suggest, however, that it is useless for our Embassy in Kuwait to deny that there have

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been modest improvements in Anglo/Iraqi relations, particularly in the oil, commercial, technical and cultural spheres. On the other hand they could surely argue that:-

a. These improvements are no more than are to be expected after nearly three years of resumed relations with the Iraqis.

b. Iraq is a tidy little export market for us and nowadays we are doing our utmost to export even to the USSR and China. The Iraqis, for their part, do not wish to become wholly reliant on the Bloc countries.

c. As for arms, we have in fact sold far less to Iraq during the last three years than to Kuwait. We would of course take carefully into account the effect of any possible sales on Kuwait's security. But do the Kuwaitis really think it is to their advantage to drive the Iraqi armed forces further into the arms of the Bloc?

d. It is totally absurd to think that we would chose a régime, which has shown some propensity for trouble-making in the Gulf and which everyone there has learnt to treat with suspicion, as our successor. What conceivably could be our motive?

e. On the contrary, there is always the hope that in improving working relations with the Iraqi régime, this may do something to help the more moderate elements here to gain ground from the wilder boys. This could obviously have some beneficial results in the Gulf.

This argument cuts no ice with Kuwait, since they believe Iraq & the Bloc are basically antipathetic.

Albion-type perfidy.

Yours Ever

D F Hawley

D F Hawley

cc His Excellency
Mr A J Wilton CMG MC
KUWAIT

His Excellency
Mr W Morris CMG
JEDDA

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1. Miss Beckett. (5)

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any reasoned rebuttal
of Kuwaiti criticism, for
the reason given in the
margin. *PC 19/2*

3/4

R M Evans Esq
Near Eastern Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1



Dear Richard,

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

3

2. Enter.

1. In paragraph 3 of FCO telegram No 42 to Kuwait, you suggested that the canard about a special relationship between HMG and the Iraqi Ba'ath was due to the modest improvement in relations between IPC and the Iraqi government.

2. I agree, of course, that the loan ⁽¹⁾ made by IPC and the other measures taken by the Company in October greatly improved the atmosphere here and it was one of the principal considerations I had in mind when referring in my letter 2/1 of 20 January 1971 to John Wilton and copied to Anthony Acland to "the now fairly widespread impression that it is we who are supporting the Ba'athist régime". However, I should perhaps remind you that this particular duck is rather longer in the bill. You may like to refer to my letter 3/13 of 29 August 1970 to Peter Tripp which shows that it was alive and strong even at that time. Still further back it was even mentioned in paragraph 13 of my despatch NEQ 3/548/1 of 5 September 1969. ^{(18) NEQ 3/548/1 (1970)}

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a. The modest improvement in relations between IPC and the Iraqi government to which you have referred.

b. Our improved trade figures with Iraq. ⁽⁴⁾


c. The matters referred to in paragraphs 3-8 of my letter 3/4 to you of 5 February 1971 (I am now sending a copy of this to John Wilton).

d. The knowledge that the Iraqis have been shopping for arms.

4. I, of course, agree that the canard is absurd and should have its throat cut as quickly as possible. May I suggest, however, that it is useless for our Embassy in Kuwait to deny that there have

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

6

NEQ 3/548/1

25 February 1971

D F Hawley Esq CMG MBE
BAGHDAD


ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS

4

1. Many thanks for your most useful letter 3/4 of 5 February. We were especially interested in what you had to say about contacts between the Baghdad University and the British medical profession and about consultancies.
2. On the military side, both Brigadier Purdon and Air Commodore Robertson were impressed by the warm welcome they received at the Army Day celebrations. They returned convinced that many Iraq Army officers genuinely want to restore certain links with Britain, so long as we are prepared to meet them at least half way. It was largely because of Brigadier Purdon's advocacy that the Ministry of Defence agreed in principle to the inclusion of Iraqis at Sandhurst and RAF Staff College courses. Yet it was perhaps not surprising that General Shihab rather spoiled the climate by his behaviour at Lord Carrington's luncheon on 13 February, where he succeeded in convincing all the (basically quite sympathetic) guests that he was the worst type of self-important Baathist boor. You will no doubt have got the same impression reading between the lines of the record of his official call on the Defence Secretary.
3. The increase in the value of our exports to Iraq is encouraging. But I suppose it is fair to add that only now, three years after resuming relations, are our exports worth about as much as they were in 1966. We had hoped it would prove

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possible to arrange official British participation in the Baghdad Fair this autumn. We have been disappointed. But we are already starting to sound out the Department of Trade and Industry about prospects for the 1972 Fair (if indeed it takes place). You will no doubt let us have your views in due course; I see that Stroud in the Department of Trade and Industry wrote to you on the subject on 10 February.

R M Evans
Near Eastern Department

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Enc

Blind copies to:

Mr John Rowley, ODA
Mr Bellamy, DTI
Mr Edmondson, Fairs & Promotions Branch, DTI



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BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

NEQ 3/548/1 27 February 1971

7

3/4

R M Evans Esq
Near Eastern Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

*I gather that
Minister of State
has yet to be
convinced about the possibility
of visiting the region.
his Mr. Egey - pr.
reply*

Dear Richard,

*This is Beckett, M.
discuss before
drafting. R.R.E.*

ANGLO/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. Many thanks for your letter NEQ3/548/1 of 25 February. 4/3
2. We were not surprised to hear of Shihab's behaviour. If one had had the opportunity of selecting the most suitable Iraqi minister to make a good impression in the United Kingdom, he would have been one of our last choices. However, it was of significance and interest that even he managed to be mildly gracious in explaining to Lord Carrington the purpose of his visit to the United Kingdom.
3. It may be useful to start thinking now whether there would be advantage in inviting another more agreeable Iraqi minister to the United Kingdom as an official guest. However, the present is not a particularly opportune time as there must be a number of ministerial changes in the near future following the dismissal of the Ministers of Planning and of Economy. I shall, in due course, be letting you have some firm recommendations about this.
4. Meantime I wonder whether there is any possibility of getting one of our ministers to visit Iraq. As you know Shaikhli, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, invited Mr Goronwy Roberts about two year's ago, but we have never responded to this. Possibly a minister from the DTI or a junior FCO minister might be the best to start the ball rolling. Again I will let you have a firmer recommendation in due course, but in the meanwhile should be grateful for your assessment of our chances in getting a United Kingdom minister to come.
5. There could also, as I have argued previously, be advantage in a visit by a senior FCO official and in this connexion I wonder if there is now any possibility of your coming this way.

Yours Ever
David Hawley
D F Hawley

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Regy ^{copies sent} 26/2

Can you pl.

send copies of

④ and ⑥ to

1. Cultural Rels Dept

2. Export Promotion "

3. Defence Dept,

and return file to me.

1/2 26/2

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8



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

NEQ 3/548/1

5 March 1971

D F Hawley Esq CMG MBE
BAGHDAD

Mr Eger
Mr Bede
Arabian Dept
Defence Dept
re R.E. 5/3

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS AND KUWAIT

1. Thank you for your letter 3/4 of 13 February on this subject.
2. We know that the Kuwait belief in Anglo/Baath collusion has a history. We know too that it must be countered, not ignored. With this in mind the Secretary of State recently agreed that, if we entered into negotiations for the sale of Sea King helicopters to Iraq (paragraph 2D of FCO telegram No 195), we should speak to the Kuwaitis before the conclusion of a contract. We would argue that there was no truth in the story of collusion with the Iraqi Baath; that we had an interest in maintaining our (once very strong) links with the Iraqi armed forces; and that the Iraqis would undoubtedly obtain helicopters from other sources if we did not supply them ourselves.
3. We and Arabian Department would be interested to know what the Embassy in Kuwait think about the line of argument developed in paragraph 4 of your letter. We ourselves think that the points at a., b. and c. could be deployed with some hope of making an impact.
4. We should incidentally be interested to know whether any approach has yet been made by you to Defence Attache Mubarak and, if so, what the reaction was (see FCO telegram No 42 to Kuwait).

R M Evans
Near Eastern Department

Copies to:

His Excellency
Mr A J Wilton CMG MC
KUWAIT

His Excellency
Mr W Morris CMG
JEDDA

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BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

3/4

5 March 1971

R M Evans Esq
Near Eastern Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1



Dear Richard,

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

(3) NEQ 1/4.

1. Thank you for your letter NEQ 1/4 of 26 January about the Annual Review for 1970. I am glad you found it stimulating and helpful but fear that I can take very little of the credit myself: it was the Ambassador's work.

2. I am not sure in fact that I agree with all the propositions in paragraph 3 of your letter. I agree, of course, that "funds of goodwill" can only be tapped if governments are not indifferent or hostile towards us. You seem to imply, however - although this has not been the tone of your recent letters - that the Ba'athist régime is so hostile that no gestures on our part would improve matters and enable us to exploit more effectively some of the latent advantages we enjoy in this country. I wonder if this is really so and think we should consider carefully:-

- a. how hostile the Iraqi Ba'athists really are towards us; and
- b. to what extent we can mitigate hostility by gestures or shows of friendship.

(124) NEQ 3/548/1.

3. The Iraqis as a whole, including the Ba'athists, are complexed about us as I argued in my despatch 1/3 of 25 August 1969, though as seen from here we have in the last two years been in danger of becoming more complexed on our own side. The image of those 1969 hangings lingers on. Of course, the Iraqis have done a good many things which are contrary to our interests. They made a number of agreements with the Bloc countries, particularly in connexion with oil. The press has been almost universally favourable to the Bloc and generally anti-Western, and there are elements in the Ba'ath Party whose basic hostility towards and suspicion of us, shows through only too clearly from time to time. Further, there was the strange reception given to Bill Luce last year (my telegram No 618 of 16 September and my letter 22/6 of 26 September to Peter Tripp). I certainly do not seek to whitewash the Ba'ath!

(41)
NB 3/359/1
(1970)

(37) NB 3/359/1 (1970)

4. On the other hand it may be useful to consider some of the ways in which the Iraqis during the two and a half years of Ba'athist rule have demonstrated contrary sentiments:-

- a. The Minister of Foreign Affairs extended an invitation to Mr Goronwy Roberts, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State,



to visit Iraq in 1969. The Iraqis on several occasions intimated that they would like this invitation taken up, but since there has been no response they naturally consider that the ball is in our court.

b. The Iraqis accorded a very warm reception to the COMET Mission which visited in October 1969 (you will have a copy of COMET's own report on this), and more recently they were still more welcoming to the Birmingham and Manchester Chambers of Commerce, despite the unfortunate incident reported in my letter to you of 13 February.

(now with P.U.S.D.)

c. Although we have come in for some battering in the Iraqi press we have on the whole, since the resumption of diplomatic relations, been spared the worst excesses of press virulence. Indeed, there have been times when the Iraqis have deliberately refrained from attacking us and been criticised internally and externally for their pains.

d. As soon as the Ba'athists came to power they put in a strong bid for British arms and equipment and this has been renewed by the recent visit of the Minister of Defence to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, we have as we have reported elsewhere been under constant pressure to be more forthcoming in our attitude over courses for Iraqi Army and Air Force officers.

(4)

e. My letter 3/4 of 5 February lists some of the ways in which the Iraqis, with singularly little or no prodding from us, have been turning in our direction.

f. Though this is a matter more of Iraqi self-interest than of sentiment, the Iraqis have at no time seriously looked as if they were going to nationalise IPC or any part of it, although this may have been their earlier intention. (See my despatch 1/3 of 25 August 1969.)

124
NEQ 3/4d.

5. It can thus be argued that the Iraqis have in a number of ways shown that they positively desire improved relationships with the UK and this theme is often repeated when we take visitors to call on Iraqi ministers. By and large our response has not so far been very forthcoming, although modest but satisfactory progress has been made in the fields of Cultural Relations - through the British Council - and of Technical Assistance.

6. The Country Assessment Sheet for Iraq states that we "share the common western interest in preventing Iraq, which is still a non-aligned country, from slipping further under the economic and political control of the Soviet Union". We should, therefore, consider what positive steps we can take to achieve this object. It is now, I believe, axiomatic that the Iraqi régime is divided between



doctrinaire Ba'athists, with whom it is difficult for us ever to reach any real accommodation, and the pragmatists. In general, therefore, our aim should surely be to strengthen the influence of the pragmatists, many of whom have themselves shown not only a disposition towards better relations with us but also a healthy fear of communist and Soviet influence. By strengthening them the attitude of the Iraqi government as a whole can be affected and this in turn may enable us to draw just a little bit more deeply on the "fund of goodwill". There are unmistakable signs that Iraq would like to lessen its dependence on the Bloc and now that they have so much more money coming in from oil following the Tehran settlement, the time is ripe to encourage them in this salutary wish. With over £100 m. extra a year coming in from oil there ought to be some choice pickings for British industry.

6. It could well be self-defeating to overegg the pudding and we must proceed circumspectly. However, I would like to see some or all of the following measures which would help the "cause of the pragmatists" as well as serve our own self-interests, being taken:-

a. A visit to Iraq by a UK minister, as well as by a senior official, in 1971. More visits by experts.

b. An official invitation to one or two Iraqi ministers to visit the UK in addition to invitations to a number of Iraqi officials about which we are writing separately.

h hand | c. A conscious effort to continue the process of being more forthcoming with the Iraqis over military courses in the UK and the supply of the less controversial hardware.

d. A steady expansion of our Technical Assistance programme together with the expansion of British Council activities. In particular consideration might be given to consultations with the Ministry of Planning about providing British expertise on some more regular basis.

In hand | e. Early progress with the Line of Credit for Iraq. This should, so far as possible, be dressed-up in the same sort of way as the "Loan Agreements" made between Iraq and other countries, particularly the Bloc.

7. This letter has turned into something of a personal swan-song. However I thought you might like to have my thoughts on what we should be doing to carry out the policy enunciated in our Country Assessment Sheet. My colleagues here agree with my suggestions.

Yours Ever

D F Hawley

D F Hawley

10

Mr Egerton

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 18 MAR 1971 NEQ 3/548/1
--

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

1. Two folios on this file require action.
2. Folio 7 : Ministerial Visits. I have discussed this with Mr Renwick who told me that the Secretary of State is considering going to both the UAR and the Gulf this year. There has also been discussion of Mr Godber visiting the UAR. Nothing is yet fixed. Mr Renwick agreed that a reply should be sent to Mr Hawley on the lines of the attached draft.
3. Folio 9 : paragraph 6 of Mr Hawley's letter of 5 March makes five recommendations in connection with Anglo-Iraqi relations. Action is in hand as follows:
 - a. and b. are covered by the attached draft on ministerial visits;
 - c. there will be more to report after the Ministry of Defence meeting on Friday 19 March to discuss the follow-up to Shihab's visit;
 - d. and e. I am in touch with CRD, ODA and ECGD.

*Veronica Beckett*Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department

16 March 1971

Enc

P.S. I have shown these pp to Mr. Lamer for info. on ministerial visits. He thinks Mr. Parsons should see them before the Ministerial Visits Committee Mtg. on Tues. 23 March.

ks.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

NEQ 3/548/1

17 March 1971

D F Hawley Esq CMG MBE
BAGHDAD

ANGLO/IRAQ RELATIONS : MINISTERIAL VISITS

1. Thank you for your letter 3/4 of 27 February to Richard Evans, who is on leave.
2. We look forward to receiving the Embassy's recommendations about inviting an Iraqi minister to the UK as an official guest, especially as plans for such a visit last year unfortunately came to nothing.
3. Within Whitehall, Ministers have been considering their programmes of visits to various countries, including the Middle East. Strictly for your own information, there are plans for ministerial visits to both the UAR (see FCO telegram No 120 (U) to Tel Aviv) and the Gulf this year, but as the situation is still fluid I am afraid we cannot let you have any details, nor can we yet assess the likelihood of a ministerial visit to Iraq. We shall however certainly bear paragraph 4 of your letter in mind in future discussions on this question. In particular I can assure you that we are well aware that any projected visit by any FCO Minister to Iran and/or the Gulf should if at all possible include Iraq; but the way Iraqis treated the visit of Sir W Luce, the Secretary of State's Personal Representative on Gulf affairs, last September still rankles, and I am not sure that we shall in the end succeed in persuading Ministers that Iraq ought to be fitted in on its own merits, if at all possible.
4. I am sorry this is such an inconclusive answer. We shall let you know as soon as there is anything firm on Ministers' plans, so that you can telegraph your views in good time. Meanwhile we are examining with those concerned the recommendations (other than on visits) set out in paragraph 6 of your letter of 5 March to Richard Evans, which was most timely.

S L Egerton
Near Eastern Department

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TO PRIORITY TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 120 OF 16 MARCH, INFO ROUTINE
CAIRO, BEIRUT, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
PARIS, MOSCOW, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, AND SAVING TO RABAT, GIBRALTAR,
MADRID, UKDEL NATO, JERUSALEM, BRUSSELS AND JEDDA.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 229 (NOT TO ALL): VISIT TO THE U.A.R.

1. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, I NOW PLAN TO VISIT THE U.A.R.
BETWEEN 13 AND 15 SEPTEMBER IN THE COURSE OF A ROUND OF VISITS
TO RABAT, GIBRALTAR AND MADRID.

2. YOU MAY CONFIRM TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT I HOPE TO VISIT
CAIRO IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE YEAR, WHILE EMPHASISING THAT
PLANS ARE NOT YET FIRM AND ADDING THAT I HOPE TO VISIT ISRAEL IN
1972.

3. NEWS DEPARTMENT ARE TAKING THE LINE, IN ANSWER TO ENQUIRIES,
THAT I EXPECT TO VISIT CAIRO IN THE LATER HALF OF THE YEAR WITHOUT
GIVING PRECISE DATES. YOU SHOULD SPEAK SIMILARLY TO THE PRESS
IF ASKED TO COMMENT.

4. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSULT THE ISRAELIS ABOUT PUBLICITY FOR
MY PROPOSED VISIT TO ISRAEL. SUBJECT TO THEIR AGREEMENT, YOU
MAY LIKE TO TELL THE PRESS ON THE RECORD, IF ENQUIRIES ARE MADE,
THAT I HAVE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE AN INVITATION FROM MR. EBAN
TO VISIT ISRAEL BUT THAT TIMING WILL DEPEND ON MY OTHER COMMITMENTS.
NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL TAKE A SIMILAR LINE IN ANSWER TO ENQUIRIES.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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
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12

Miss Dooley
CRD



Anglo/Iraqi Relations.

1. I should be grateful if you would let me have your urgent comments on para 6 d. of Mr. Hanley's letter of 5 March. Have you any suggestions for expansion of B.C. activity — or arguments against such expansion?

Beckett
NEQ 16/3

Miss Beckett NEQ

The British Council is unable to contemplate expansion anywhere at present since it finds itself in very straitened circumstances. However, when the English Language Teaching Institute is finally established, this will no doubt provide opportunities for increased educational contacts: the British Council will be recruiting before long an Assistant Director (Technical) for the Institute, though we have told the Embassy they may not sign the memorandum setting up the Institute until the question of the missing interest is cleared up.

2. As you are aware, there has been a recent increase in medical contacts between the 2 countries; some of these the Council is sponsoring, for others it acts as an agency ady.

BU 23/3

Sted

I have not got the names but other details are as follows:


- i) 3 examiners in medicine will go in June, the Iraqis paying costs;
- ii) Iraqis have asked for a surgeon - the Council will try to send one on from Iran;
- iii) The Council will spare 3 delegates to the Conference on University Education, to be held 4/18 May; subjects - engineering, medicine & chemistry;
- iv) They are trying to find a specialist on technical comprehensive education to go out in the autumn;
- v) a haematologist is to go out to examine in September; in the same month a consultant bacteriologist will also visit;
- vi) The Manchester Stables Theatre is to give 4 performances in Iraq as part of their 15 Middle East tour in August/September this year.

3. The Council Representative prepares his annual programme in consultation with the Embassy, so that although there can be no expansion, the programme will no doubt be drawn up on approved lines.

Harry Jodley
CRJ 17/13

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3/6



R M Evans Esq
Near Eastern Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Can this exchange
now cease, or
BRITISH EMBASSY
KUWAIT
to we need (13)
to comment

20 March 1971
further? I hope
not.

16
① Mr Egeir
② Miss Beate
Mr Beate (Archi)
L. E.

R. E.

25/3

Dear Evans,

ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS IN KUWAIT

1. Please refer to your letter NEQ 3/548/1 of 5 March to Donald Hawley.

2. My first reaction to his letter to you of 13 February was that points (a), (b) and (d) of his paragraph 4 were useful and I had in fact already used them when attacked on this before. I am less sure that points (c) and (e) would carry much conviction here. Fortunately the Kuwaitis have gone off this particular tease in recent weeks (whether because they found our amazed rebuttals convincing or for some other reason we may never know) and we certainly do not now wish to stir it up again. One day, no doubt, something new will happen to renew their suspicions and we shall have to return to the charge. Meanwhile we have the arguments fairly well by heart.

Yours etc.

John Wilton.

A J Wilton

c.c. D F Hawley Esq CMG MBE
BAGHDAD

W Morris Esq CMG
JEDDA

A A Acland Esq
Arabian Department
FCO

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British Embassy


BAGHDAD

14

3/4

26 March 1971

S L Egerton Esq
F C O
London S W 1



Dear Stephen,

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS: MINISTERIAL VISITS

1. Your letter NEQ 3/548/1 of 17 March to Donald Hawley invited us to nominate an Iraqi minister to be invited to the United Kingdom this year as an official guest.

2. If the intention is that we should chose a technical minister rather than a high level politician, then our choice would fall on Dr Sa'ad Abdul Baqi al Rawi, Minister of Education (Leading Personality No 69). We and the British Council, as you know, have been striving to develop educational links with the Iraqis, in our own interests as well as theirs; and Sa'ad al Rawi has shown himself not unresponsive. He is, of course, the minister we deal with over the project for an English Language Teaching Institute and he, at least, is enthusiastic about getting it off the ground. And there are, of course, other projects in the educational field, more perhaps on the British Council's front than our own, in which his goodwill is necessary. Although this applies almost more to the Minister of Higher Education, Dr Su'ad Khalil Ismail, I rather doubt whether an invitation to her would be accepted and there are tensions between her and university presidents which might conceivably jeopardise her tenure of office. In any case she has travelled a good deal and needs less introduction to things British than her colleague at the Ministry of Education. A programme for Dr Sa'ad could be worked out here with British Council assistance without difficulty if and when we are authorised to extend an invitation.

3. If, however, the thought is now abroad in London of inviting a policy-making minister, then I would like to revert to the suggestion I have submitted twice before that Saddam Hussain should be invited. When I first made the suggestion early in 1970 the answer was that the hangings of January 1969 were still too fresh in the memory to contemplate adopting it. When I suggested it again (in my letter 2/12 of 21 November) there was no answer at all. And even now, as I am dictating this letter, I fancy I can see a look of pain passing over your face on receiving it. But I still think it makes sense, if the function of diplomacy is to try to persuade wrong-headed foreign policy-makers to modify their views; and if anyone has entertained doubts as to whether Saddam is still at the centre of policy-making in Iraq, his recent policy speeches should have removed them. In point of fact, I should be very surprised indeed if he

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NEQ 3/548/1

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See interim
reply at ⑪
p. 25/4

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accepted an invitation, if only because he does not like to absent himself from the control-panels, so the pain and strain would almost certainly be limited to just authorizing me to convey it. He would certainly be gratified if an invitation were extended; and the extending of it (though this is of course a very minor consideration), would give me the opportunity to get access to him, which is otherwise very hard to come by. No doubt if you were prepared to entertain the idea of extending an invitation in principle, you would feel obliged to explain it away to our various "friends" in the area - the Shah, the Al Sabah, the Al Saud, etc - who would want to seize upon it as confirmation of the nefarious relationship they claim to detect between the British and the Iraqi Ba'ath; but I would not have thought it impossible to satisfy them that our motives were honourable.

4. Purely in terms of personalities, of course, Saad would be a much easier guest than Saddam. He speaks English fluently and though I described him in my Personalities Report as "a rather tight-lipped professional, assumed to be a Ba'athist", he is not difficult or disagreeable. Saddam on the other hand speaks no English. I could, of course, offer my services, if by any chance a visit did take place and my presence as interpreter was thought worthwhile.

5. As regards the last two paragraphs of your letter, dealing with the possibility of a ministerial visit in the other direction, all I would say at present is that I hope the discourteous treatment of Bill Luce last September will not be held by itself to be an insurmountable objection.

Henry
Glen
H G Ballour Paul

~~cc Mr R W Benwick~~
~~Private Secretary to the~~
~~Rt Hon Joseph Godber MP~~
~~FCO~~

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

NEQ 3/548/1

1 April 1971

A C D S MacRae Esq
BAGHDAD

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

1. I am replying (rather belatedly, I fear) to Donald Hawley's letter of 5 March on this subject.

2. Taking first the general point in his paragraphs 2 and 3, I did not wish to imply in my letter of 26 January that the present Baathist régime was so hostile towards us that any attempt to improve our relations with it would be futile. My meaning was simply that we could not expect the state of our relations with Iraq to be better than the state of our relations with its government.

3. We have carefully considered the proposals in paragraph 6 of Donald Hawley's letter. Points (a) and (b) were covered by Stephen Egerton's letter NEQ 3/548/1 of 17 March and point (c) by FCO telegram No 337 of 19 March. (You should know that MOD have been pressing us for information on the outcome of the Ambassador's meeting with Shihab. We should be grateful for anything you can tell us about this.) The notes Ken Frost wrote after his visit to Baghdad in early March record the Embassy's satisfaction with the progress of the technical assistance programme over the past six months (point (d)). Do you nevertheless want the programme to be expanded? If so, are you planning to put specific recommendations to the ODA? On British Council activities, the outlook is perhaps less good; the Council is unable to contemplate expansion anywhere at present because it has financial difficulties. However, the establishment of the British Language Institute in Baghdad should provide opportunities for increased cultural activities. Furthermore, the growth of medical contacts between Britain and Iraq is most encouraging. Finally, on point (e), you will by now have seen a copy of MacMahon's draft memorandum on what

- 1 -

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ECGD could offer Iraq.

4. You will be glad to know that Ashwood has been pressing hard for an information stand at this year's Baghdad Fair and is hopeful of success. He will be in touch with you direct about this.

R M Evans
Near Eastern Department

Copies to:

J Ashwood Esq
CRE 4
DTI

K Frost Esq
ODA

G MacMahon Esq
ECGD

- 2 -

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PHER/CAT A

FM F.C.O. 191845Z

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TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 337 OF 19 MARCH.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 292: FOLLOW-UP TO GENERAL SHIHAB'S VISIT.

1. A MEETING TODAY BETWEEN MOD AND FCO OFFICIALS AGREED THAT YOU MIGHT MAKE THE POINTS IN PARAS 2-5 BELOW AT YOUR MEETING WITH GENERAL SHIHAB.

2. ARMY STAFF COLLEGE COURSES. AS IMPLIED IN MOD TEL. LDF/RLF OF 15 MARCH, THE NEXT ARMY STAFF COLLEGE COURSE FOR WHICH FOREIGN STUDENTS ARE ELIGIBLE BEGINS IN JANUARY 1972. (NO ARMY STAFF COLLEGE COURSE FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS STARTS IN OCTOBER 1971). IRAQ HAS NOW BEEN PLACED ON THE LIST FOR CONSIDERATION FOR A SURRENDERED VACANCY. BIDS FOR THESE VACANCIES WILL BE CONSIDERED IN JUNE AND WE WILL LET THE IRAQIS KNOW THE OUTCOME IMMEDIATELY. (STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE FCO VIEW IS THAT IRAQ SHOULD HAVE HIGH PRIORITY. IT IS HOWEVER IMPOSSIBLE TO TAKE A DECISION ON IRAQ IN ISOLATION FROM THE OTHER CONTENDERS BEFORE JUNE BECAUSE IT IS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE AMONG APPLICANTS THAT SURRENDERED VACANCIES ARE DISTRIBUTED AT THIS TIME).

3. RAF STAFF COLLEGE COURSES. THE NEXT COURSE AT BRACKNELL BEGINS IN OCTOBER. THE IRAQIS HAVE BEEN INVITED TO BID (VIA THE AIR ATTACHE AT BAGHDAD), BUT SO FAR THEY HAVE NOT REPLIED. YOU MAY WISH TO EMIND GENERAL SHIHAB THAT BIDS MUST BE IN BY THE END OF APRIL. IT IS LIKELY THAT DECISIONS ON PLACES FOR THIS COURSE AND THE CAMBERLEY COURSE WILL BE REACHED AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME.

4. OTHER COURSES. HOWEVER, AS AN INDICATION OF OUR GOODWILL TOWARDS IRAQ WE CAN NOW OFFER 2 DEFINITE PLACES THIS YEAR ON COURSES AT THE SCHOOL OF INFANTRY: ONE VACANCY ON THE PLATOON COMMANDERS COURSE AND ONE VACANCY ON THE COMPANY COMMANDERS COURSE. WE HAVE ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SENIOR IRAQI OFFICERS VISITING TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS IN THE UK. THE IRAQIS HAVE ASKED ABOUT THIS LATTER POINT IN GENERAL TERMS BUT PERHAPS YOU COULD ASK GENERAL SHIHAB TO BE MORE SPECIFIC.

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/5. SALES. WE ARE

5. SALES. WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY DEFINITE REQUESTS THE IRAQIS WISH TO MAKE, SUBJECT TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. (IF THE IRAQIS RAISE CHIEFTAIN OR JAGUAR YOU SHOULD HOWEVER DISCOURAGE THEIR INTEREST AS THEY CANNOT BE SUPPLIED WITH THESE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE). YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THREE IRAQI SERVICE ATTACHES IN LONDON VISITED THE DEFENCE SALES EXHIBITION ON 8 MARCH. THEIR INTEREST CENTRED ON VARIOUS ITEMS OF ELECTRONIC AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT. WE SHOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE DETAILS OF THEIR REQUIREMENTS AS A RESULT OF THIS VISIT.

6. MOD ARE SENDING ON THEIR OWN CHANNELS FURTHER BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR YOUR MEETING.

7. WE ARE SORRY IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO GIVE A DEFINITE REPLY ON STAFF COLLEGE COURSES UNTIL THE SUMMER, BUT WE HOPE THE INFORMATION IN PARA 4 WILL GO SOME WAY TO SHOWING THE IRAQIS THAT WE ARE TAKING THEIR REQUESTS SERIOUSLY.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES:

NED
DEF.D.
SIR W LUCE
SIR S CRAWFORD
MR ROSE

COPIES TO:

DS6, DS 8, DS11, DS13,
MR SHEEN

MOD
MAS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1



NEQ 1/4

26 January 1971

D F Hawley Esq CMG MBE
BAGHDAD

ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1970

1. Your Annual Review for 1970 reached the Department on 14 January. We have now sent it to the printers (for General and Commonwealth Q distribution).
2. I found your despatch extremely stimulating. I also found it most helpful; having only become responsible for Iraq at the beginning of October, it was most useful to me to have an account of developments during the year as a whole. I shall express the same sentiments to Glen Balfour Paul if and when I see him. I detected here and there traces of his own very characteristic manner of putting things.
3. I had always myself doubted the validity of the proposition that a show of friendship towards the Ba'athist régime would enable us to draw on the fund of goodwill and friendship for this country which continues to exist in Iraq. I am glad to see that we agree about this. My own view has always been that funds of goodwill in foreign countries can only be tapped if governments are not indifferent or hostile towards us. All this said, it is nevertheless encouraging that the régime itself is readier than in the past to do business with us.
4. I have asked Arabian Department whether they have any comments to make on your judgments about how Anglo/Iraqi relations are likely to be affected by developments in and over the Gulf. I shall let you know whether they have anything to say.

R M Evans
Near Eastern Department

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15 AAA

A good letter, but with some traces of special pleading.
BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

Enter
to submit
(Answer/Answer/Answer)



4 July, 1970.
CONFIDENTIAL 17 July

2. I think we shall
(2/12) M.B.P.
on some of these
points.

① in Trip 69.7
N. Eger
We will consider
② Back to me. 9/7

I think this is for NED. to
answer, although I would like to
discuss the substance. Cd. we seek
to consult Nag a little about the subj.
Cd. we ask him to join in a public
declaration of support for the UAE?

Dear Acland,

I have not previously commented on Cassandra's suggestion that our interests in the Gulf might best be served by trying (as Stewart Crawford puts it in his letter 3/15 of 23 June) to make friends with the Iraqi Ba'ath. It seemed to me a safe bet that on this particular ride the unhorsing of Cassandra could safely be left to someone else.

2. Such comments as I offer now are emphatically not meant as a recommendation in favour of a radical change of policy towards the Iraqi régime, even if there is a risk of their turning out the winner in Sam Falle's decolonisation stakes (paragraph 13 of his letter 3/6 of 14 June). NBK4/2.11

3. All I wish to suggest is that there has been in recent months a slight but detectable change for the better in Iraqi postures and that a slight but detectable change in our own counter-postures might be useful.

4. The sort of indicators of a growing sense of realism and moderation on the part of this régime which I have in mind (they have all been reported in one form or another and I will not weary you with references) are:

- (a) On Palestine, what seems like a genuine attempt to mediate helpfully in the recent Jordan imbroglio; and public admission by President Bakr that a peaceful solution is not ruled out by definition, provided it is not imposed against the will of the Palestinians.
- (b) Internally, the expulsion of some of the wild boys from the heights of power, the most recent being Salah Omar al Ali; and the studied moderation of recent pronouncements by Saddam Hussain, now universally regarded as the Party pace-maker.

how to keep
S.M.A. & T.

is a result of
an internal
Power Struggle
NOT because
the war is "cold"

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
NEQ
3/548/1

A.A. Acland, Esq.,
Arabian Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

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Now see (17) Po PAMA 72/12



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- (c) In their relations with the Communist countries a perceptible cooling off on the Iraqi side marked by signs of dissatisfaction on the other side. Frequent reminders that the Communist revolution and the Arab revolution are two different things. ✓
- (d) In their relations with ourselves, repeated assurances that, whatever major differences exist, they want good working relations with us, more technical assistance, etc., and that they emphatically do not relish increased dependence on one side in the great divide.
- (e) An impression amongst observers here that the régime, now firmly in the saddle, is maturing with the prolonged exercise of power, suspects that extremism does not necessarily pay and that friends, external as well as internal, are positively desirable.

5. One can of course quote plenty of counter-indicators but they are mostly of a minor kind. The balance is on the right side. I am not suggesting that their long-term aims and ambitions are any different; but perhaps they recognise that some of the traffic lights have changed to red and that they had better drive cautiously if they want to reach their destination.

6. 'This is little enough to build on; but if, as many people seek to persuade me, they are signalling to us after their fashion, there is something to be said, in our future interests, for signalling back. Saddam Hussain is certainly the man with the flags at this end. Would an official invitation to England raise too many eyebrows? Failing this, some other sign of a willingness on the part of our new Government to exchange views, e.g. by proposing a ministerial visit here, on the way perhaps to or from Iran, would help. Certainly some indication, as I have suggested in other correspondence, that we recognise the legitimacy of their interests in the Gulf even if we do not approve their manner of pursuing them, might encourage a better understanding on their part of our own (and other peoples') interests. Similarly, a re-statement at high level of our readiness to contribute, so far as circumstances allow, to the development of Iraq would

/help

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help to disabuse the régime of any idea that we are out to subvert it. I need not mention again the key political desideratum of a settlement of the I.P.C. dispute.

✓ 7. What I am suggesting, in short, is that without any major or conspicuous change of attitude we might encourage, if not virtue, at least a reduction in vice by sending a judicious signal in the direction of the Ba'ath. I should have thought this could be done without alarming other Governments in the area, provided they were told what it was for.

Yours ever

H. G. Balfour Paul

(H.G. Balfour Paul)

Copies to: Sir S. Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
H.M. Political Resident,
Bahrain.

W. Morris, Esq., C.M.G.,
H.M. Ambassador,
Jedda.

D. Murray, Esq.,
H.M. Ambassador,
Tehran.

S. Falle, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.C.,
H.M. Ambassador,
Kuwait.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. ~~Parsons~~

Mr. Evans asked me to pass to you the correspondence about Anglo-Iraqi relations. The incoming letters from Mr. Hawley are at Flags A,B and C; Mr. Evans' acknowledgements are at Flags D and E.

Smith
(B. Smith)

8 April, 1971

Many thanks.

AS!

8

4.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1



NEQ 3/548/1

22 April 1971

His Excellency
Mr H G Balfour Paul CMG
BAGHDAD

ANGLO/IRAQ RELATIONS : MINISTERIAL VISITS (16)

1. Thank you for your letter of 26 March recommending that an Iraqi Minister be invited to visit the UK this year.
2. I am afraid we cannot yet give you a final answer on this. But I thought you would like to know that we had a useful talk on this subject with Donald Hawley before he left; and that we are recommending that Dr Sa'ad should be invited. I will write again as soon as we have Ministers' reactions.

S L Egerton
Near Eastern Department

Handwritten:
24/4 29/4
BU 29/4

Handwritten:
See separate
Blue memo
d/b.
16 23/4

Confidential.

Reference

Eph.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 23 APR 1971
NEQ 1548/1

Mr. Egey.

Anglo/Iraqi Relations: Ministerial Visits.

1. I should be grateful if we could discuss Mr. Balfour Paul's letter of 26 March. It seems to me that the time has come to consider seriously the question of inviting an Iraqi Minister. In view of developments on the medical education front I should have thought the ~~Minister~~ Minister of Education would be a good choice.

I. Beckett
13/4.

Whenever you like. I am all for trying to get the Minister of Education. He will of course wish to come in mid-summer, when it is hottest in Baghdad.

2. Much as I'd like to invite Saddam Tikriti or get a refusal, I think this would be risky. We have already had a senior Baathist who must have some effect as

Folio 14

[I have attached copies of last year's references below].

policy making (General
Shihab), & we should not
risk another calamitous
visit of that sort in the
near future in my view.

V. E. Egerton

13/4

Miss Beckett

See blue minute, 2 dfts of 23/4.

1823/4

CONFIDENTIAL

(52)

British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

Reference: 2/12

21 November, 1970

IRAQ AND THE GULF

In my telegram No. 793 (not to Moscow) I said that, while accepting the objections to a representative from here swelling numbers at the recent Political Agents' meeting in Bahrain, we should be glad of an opportunity in due course to discuss with others concerned the likely reactions of the Iraqi régime to developments in the Gulf, notably the disposal of the "strategic" islands at the mouth of the Gulf. The suggestion that my Defence Attaché, during his expected stop-over in Bahrain on 17 November, should have a preliminary run-over the course with the Political Residency came to nothing, since his visit was cancelled. It may therefore be worth my hazarding a few thoughts on the subject, in amplification of those in paragraph 3 of my telegram.

2. Perhaps I should preface my specific conjectures with a general one, which is this. In all their recent endeavours to expand their influence westwards into the Arab world the Iraqis have been conspicuously unsuccessful. Baulked of their hopes of taking-over the Libyan revolution, increasingly pilloried by Cairo, made to look ridiculous by their own recent behaviour in Jordan, at odds with their international Ba'athist patron saint Aflaq, and now it seems outflanked by Hafez al-Assad in Syria - there seems little opening for them in a westward direction. But a "progressive" revolutionary Arab government has to have a forward policy somewhere. As I see it, therefore, the incentive to make a bid southwards must now be increasingly potent. Add to this their frantic resentment at Iranian ambitions in the Gulf and their ideological opposition to the sheikhly régimes ripe (as they believe) for subversion on the Arab side, and you have a pretty heady mixture. It only needs evidence of the "betrayal of Arabism" by the owners of the "strategic" islands and the consequent jeopardizing of Iraq's own freedom of navigation through the Gulf for the mixture to become dangerously intoxicating.

3. All this of course assumes that the Iraqi Ba'ath's new-found pragmatism, which we here claim to have detected in other fields of activity, does not act as an effective antidote. But contingency planning has to embrace the "worst case".

/4. So much

A. A. Acland, Esq.,
Arabian Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
LONDON S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

4. So much by way of prefatory generalization. The rest of this letter will try to particularize. What, in short, could the Iraqis actually do to cause trouble in the Gulf? And what could we do to prevent or discourage them?

5. I said in my telegram No. 793 that news of a deal with Iran over the islands will certainly cause a hullabaloo here. (There are some ominous warning shots being fired already; and yesterday's editorial in the government newspaper sternly declared that if there was any monkeying about with the Arab islands Iraq would hold Britain responsible and resist it.) Hullabaloo by itself, of course, i.e. just sound and fury, hurts no one - not in their vital regions, at least. And though a propaganda onslaught would sour the atmosphere here, losing Britain a lot of promising business, and cause a ripple or two elsewhere in the Arab world, it would hardly prove disastrous. (Much less of course would the outcry the Iraqis will no doubt indulge in if, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs said to me the other day, we deceitfully fail to bang the Rulers' heads together and make them unite.)

6. It is less easy to see what practical measures they could take by way of retaliation. But the following possibilities occur to me:

Against the Rulers

- (a) They might greatly accelerate subversion in the sheikhdoms, particularly against the traitorous Rulers of Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah. This might well go to the length of assassination (or they might use the threat of assassination to dissuade the Rulers in advance from completing the island deal).
- (b) They might occupy, with or without the agreement of the frightened Rulers, some other island such as Sir Abu Nu'eir. No doubt they could be evicted but the confrontation might be slightly unpleasant.
- (c) More meaningfully, they might (rather than assassinate him) compel the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah to accept the establishment on his territory of a "protective" air/land rocket base, from which they would threaten the Iranian occupants of the Tunbs.

Against Iran

- (d) They might, out of helplessness and as an act of reckless bravado - and perhaps only at a later stage and if things escalate - set Abadan ablaze by one pyrotechnic means or another.

/Against Us.

- 3 -

Against Us

- (e) They might, in the same frame of mind, confiscate at least the Basra Petroleum Company, relying perhaps on the Russians to bale them out of the consequences.
- (f) They might take their courage in both hands and really have a go at Kuwait (by one of the procedures discussed in other correspondence) and the K.O.C.

Against everyone on the wrong side

- (g) They might invite the Russians to establish a permanent naval presence based in Basra.
- (h) They might covertly organize the sabotage or hi-jacking of tankers.
- (i) They might, in the name of Arabism, seek a concession from the new régime in Muscat enabling them to establish a military presence in the Musandam peninsular, "covering" the straits. (Since this letter was drafted I have seen a mysterious reference in Alan Goodison's letter 2/5 to you of 18 November to "the [Iraqi] men on the Musandam Peninsular" about which we here are wholly unsighted.)

7. Of these - and disregarding the bloodymindedness of one kind and another which we must expect to be directed at H.M.G. here - I would say that (a) was far the most likely, and (g) - if the Russians could be prevailed upon to respond, regardless of repercussions in Tehran - the most unwelcome.

8. You may say that all this is fanciful scaremongering. So would I - but not perhaps for the same reason. By that I mean that, even though these particular conjectures may be fanciful or, alternatively, harmless, I do believe that Iraqi resentment will issue in some physical form even if I have not identified it. (Their recent experience in Jordan of talking big and doing nothing must have been a lesson for them, though they do not seem to have drawn the obvious conclusion.)

9. If that, at least, is accepted, is there anything we could do to discourage it? Not, as far as I can see, anything very effective. But because the Iraqis have one undeniably valid point - their legitimate interest in freedom of navigation into and out of the Gulf - I think we should at least make a show of seeing their point and try to get them to see our's (and the Rulers'), despite the shoddy treatment they gave Bill Luce in September. I understood from Mr. Godber, when he received me in September, that he intended to take in Baghdad in the tour he would be making of the area, once H.M.G. had made up their mind about Withdrawal; and I suppose it just possible that this might be combined with an attempt to persuade the

/Iraqis

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- 4 -

This is worth remembering

Iraqis to accept the realities over the islands (and the U.A.E.) This would obviously help, if expected timings (about which I know next to nothing) happened to fit. Perhaps also something could be done at the London end, e.g. by the Secretary of State himself calling in at a judicious moment the Iraqi Ambassador, preferably along with other Arab Ambassadors, and putting the hard facts squarely before them. Indeed I believe there would be something to be gained from an early invitation to Saddam Hussain to lead a delegation to London to discuss Anglo/Iraqi relations generally, the present subject being included on the agenda. Last time I suggested inviting Saddam to London I was told the hangings of January 1969 were too fresh in the memory to contemplate it; but history has moved on a bit since then. And so, as I read the situation here, has Saddam. What has surely not changed is Soviet readiness to exploit any opening in this area that we may present them with.

10. Whether or not anything can be done at top level, it would help to know what line we should take locally and when. You may have seen my letter of 18 November to Richard Evans recording Sheikhly's current probings on the subject. Incidentally, if as seems likely the two Rulers fail at the last fence in the Island steeple-chase, what is our answer to suggestions that the dispute is surely one for the Security Council and a U.N. presence in the Hormuz Straits?

11. I apologize for the terrible length of this letter.

(H. G. Balfour Paul)

Copied to: H.M. Representatives, Kuwait, Jeddah, Tehran.

British Political Residency, Bahrain.

H.M. Political Agents, Bahrain, Doha, Abu Dhabi,
Dubai.

H.M. Consul General, Muscat.

United Kingdom Mission to the U.N., New York.

Chanceries Washington and Moscow.

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Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1



17

(NEQ 3/548/1).

21 July 1970.

f 15

I have delayed replying to your letter 2/12 of 4 July to Anthony Acland in case some sensational and ill-considered Iraqi action during last week's revolutionary celebrations put into reverse the slight trend towards moderation and common sense in Iraqi attitudes which you have detected (and described in paragraph 4 of your letter). However, as it happens, apart from a warning about Basra Petroleum Company's spare capacity, we appear so far to have escaped unscathed:

2. I agree that if the Iraqis are, however tentatively, seeking a better relationship with us and with other non-Communist countries, it would be good sense for us, in our turn, to hang out more flags. We, of course recognise that Iraq has legitimate interests in the Gulf and, therefore, in the future of the area and that we should take proper account of this when formulating our Gulf policy. I think we can claim to have done so since 18 June, and we shall probably want you to seek Iraqi views on the Gulf again in due course.

3. We have considered your suggestion of extending an official invitation to visit the U.K. to Saddam Hussain al-Tikriti, but do not think the time is ripe (especially from the standpoint of our new Administration) for inviting him to this country just yet. The indicators of a sense of realism and moderation set out in paragraph 4 of your letter need to become a little more numerous before they would look convincing in a submission! However, you can rest assured that we shall strongly recommend that Baghdad should be included in the itinerary of any Minister, or other representative of the Secretary of State who may visit the Gulf during the process of consultation about future policy there.

His Excellency,
Mr. H. G. Balfour Paul, C.M.G.,
Baghdad.

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4. We would also recommend that such a visitor took the opportunity to assure the Iraqis that we recognise the legitimacy of their interests in the Gulf and put it to them that it would be helpful for the future stability of the area if Iraq could, at the appropriate time, come out in concert with other riparian powers in open support of the UAE. Even if a joint declaration including the Iranians would be impossible for the Iraqis to subscribe to, a Saudi-Kuwaiti-Iraqi declaration of support for the UAE would be well worth having.

(J. P. Tripp)

c.c. Sir S. Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
H.M. Political Resident,
Bahrain.

W. Morris, Esq., C.M.G.,
H.M. Ambassador,
Jedda.

Sir D. Wright, K.C.M.G.,
H.M. Ambassador,
Tehran.

S. Falle, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.C.,
H.M. Ambassador,
Kuwait.

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18

ministry of state

Mr ~~Kershaw~~

Mr ~~Renwick~~

Private Secretary

Mr ~~Parsons~~



PROPOSED VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BY AN IRAQI MINISTER

Flag A (9)

1. In his letter of 5 March Mr Hawley suggested that one or two Iraqi Ministers should be invited to the UK, as a move of this kind might give encouragement to the pragmatists in the Ba'athi regime. He argued that the Ba'athi regime is divided between those who are doctrinaire, with whom it is difficult for us ever to reach any real accommodation, and those (the great majority) who are pragmatists, with little comprehension of or interest in ideology of any sort. Our aim should therefore be to strengthen the influence of the latter. We then asked the Embassy in Baghdad for recommendations as to who should be invited.

Flag B (11)

Flag C (14)

2. The Ambassador's letter of 26 March suggested that our range of choice lay between a "technician" minister and a high level politician. In the former category he proposed either Dr el-Rawi, the Minister of Education, or Dr Sa'ad Ismail, the Minister of Higher Education; in the latter category, he tentatively suggested Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, the Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and the power behind the scenes.

3. The Iraq Minister of Defence, a Party figure, visited London and received some official hospitality in January. This visit was only a qualified success. To invite a figure as prominent as Saddam at a time when there is so much anxiety about Iraq's intentions in the Gulf after our military withdrawal would be to invite criticism of our judgement and motives from Iran and Kuwait, not to mention Israel.

4. On the other hand, an invitation to the Iraqi Minister of Education could be justified on the grounds that:


a. there is a direct British interest in furthering higher education in Iraq. The British Council's work is expanding, and the English Language Teaching Institute project is now under way, supported by Dr al-Rawi;

b. Dr al-Rawi is a moderate Ba'athist. A successful visit from him would encourage the "moderate pragmatists" in the Baghdad regime (though we cannot pretend that it would prevent unwelcome Iraqi decisions in purely political fields, eg Gulf or Arab-Israel policy).

Flag E

5. One further point. The situation of the Iraqi Jews is still not satisfactory. But we now believe that virtually all the Jews reported to have been arrested on charges of smuggling or trying to escape from the country illegally in March/April have been released. This may be due in part to the urgent representations by Western representatives (including our Ambassador).

6. I accordingly recommend that Dr. al-Rawi be invited to this country as a guest of HMG. The Government Hospitality Fund tell us informally that they would be able to fit in such a visit in September or October. I submit a draft letter from the Private Secretary to the Government Hospitality Fund, seeking their formal agreement to a visit at that time. When the Government Hospitality Fund have answered, the second draft I submit, instructing Mr Balfour-Paul to invite Dr al-Rawi, ~~without further delay~~, could be despatched. Arabian Department concur.


S L Egerton
Near Eastern Department

29 April 1971

Encs

Copies to: Mr Acland
Mr Evans

Mr Kershaw

Mr Renwick

Private Secretary

I agree with the recommendation. I cannot say that I am filled with enthusiasm for the prospect of inviting an Iraqi Minister to London. However, the Iraqi régime is starting to show more interest in better relations with us, eg over the purchase of arms, training courses, etc, and we need to minimise Iraqi illwill insofar as the Gulf is concerned. Any influence we can have

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in the direction of supporting the moderates within the Ba'athist régime would be a step in the right direction.


2. I think that we should be prepared to withdraw the invitation if something dreadful happens in the meantime, e.g. the hanging or mass imprisonment of Iraqi Jews; violent propaganda attacks against our Gulf policy, etc.



A D Parsons

29 April 1971

Copy to: Mr. LeQuesne



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W 18

SAAD ABDUL BAQI AL-RAWI (DR.)

Minister of Education.

Born 1930. Educated at Anah and later the American University of Beirut when he took a B.Sc. in Chemistry. He then took his M.A. in Biology and Chemistry at Illinois University in 1955, and Ph.D. at Stanford in 1959. Appointed Chairman of Chemists at the Directorate of Industrial Planning in 1960 and later joined Baghdad University College of Sciences. Director of Missions and Cultural Relations at the Ministry of Education in 1963. Returned to the College of Sciences in July 1968 and then acted for a year as Vice President of Baghdad University. Appointed President of Basrah University in 1969 but gave that up when appointed Minister of Education 31 December 1969.

A rather tight-lipped professional, assumed to be a Ba'athist. He displays enthusiasm for the proposed establishment of an English Language Teaching Institute, with British Council collaboration, under the direction of his Ministry.

SA'ADUN GHAIIDAN AL-QAISI AL-'ANI (MAJOR-GENERAL)

Minister of the Interior.

Sunni. Born in Ramadi in 1930. Graduated from Military College in 1953. Attended Tank Course at Lulworth in 1961 and was later seconded to the Royal Scots Greys in Germany. He speaks nostalgically of this period. In 1963 appointed Commander of the Khalid Tank Regiment. May 1967 appointed Commander of the Republican Guard Tank Regiment. In this capacity he played a crucial rôle in the coup of 17 July 1968; he is thought to have been plotting with the Ba'ath for some time. After the coup he was appointed Baghdad Garrison Commander and a member of the Revolutionary Command Council. A member of the "Peace Committee" formed to implement the Kurdish settlement of 11 March 1970. Replaced Salih Mahdi Ammash (q.v.) as Minister of the Interior 3 April 1970.

Reasonably helpful and professedly well-disposed. He speaks very little English.

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Mr. Egerton

Iraqi Minister of Education



Mr. Godber would prefer to wait until Sir William Luce returns from the Gulf before deciding whether to invite the Iraqi Minister of Education to visit Britain.

2. He would be grateful therefore if these papers could be brought up in one month's time with Sir William's comments.

R. W. Renwick

(R. W. Renwick)
3 May, 1971

copies: Mr. Parsons
Miss Beckett

~~3/5~~ 3/5
① ~~Mr. Adams~~ for info
② Miss Beckett
for further interim
letter to Baghdad, as
discussed ✓

③ B/u to Miss Beckett
(for submission to Sir
W. Luce) on 30/5.

CONFIDENTIAL

pa b

ce 3/5



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

20

NEQ 3/548/1

4 May 1971

His Excellency
Mr H G Balfour Paul CMG
BAGHDAD

ANGLO/IRAQ RELATIONS : MINISTERIAL VISITS

(17)

1. Would you please refer to my letter of 22 April?
2. The Minister of State has now seen our recommendation that Dr Sa'ad al Rawi should be invited to this country as an official guest of HMG. Before making any final decision on this Mr Godber would like to wait until Sir William Luce has returned from the Gulf. Of course we hope that Sir William will be able to endorse our recommendation, but obviously his views will be conditioned by his experiences on his forthcoming visit to Baghdad, if indeed as I much hope he is received there (your telegram No 488).

(attached)

S L Egerton
Near Eastern Department

pm 16.5/5 mtd 5/5
NB BU on 30/5

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL



COPY

W20

FM BAGHDAD 280956Z

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 488 OF 28/4 INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN AND CAIRO.

YOUR TELNO 515 : LUCE'S VISIT. (460)

1. I HAVE SPOKEN ACCORDINGLY TO THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, REQUESTING AN APPOINTMENT FOR LUCE WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND AM FOLLOWING THIS UP WITH A NOTE.
2. IF I RECEIVE NO REPLY BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK, WHEN I AM HOPING TO TAKE MR EVANS TO SEE THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, I WILL PURSUE THE MATTER PERSONALLY WITH THE MINISTER THEN.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION.

ARAB D

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DEFENCE D

NEWS D

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British Embassy
BAGHDAD

8 May 1971

21

3/4

S L Egerton Esq
Near Eastern Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. 10
13 MAY 1971
NEQ 3/548/1

Enter or submit.

Dear Stephen,

ANGLO/IRAQ RELATIONS: MINISTERIAL VISITS

1. Your letter NEQ 3/548/1 of 4 May about inviting Dr Sa'ad Abdul Baqi al Rawi to the United Kingdom as an official guest, reached me at the very moment I returned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I had been called by the Director-General of Protocol to be given the answer to my request that Sir William Luce should be received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As I am reporting elsewhere by telegram the answer was that Sir William Luce would be welcome to visit Iraq, that Under-Secretary Ni'ma al Ni'ma would be happy to see him, but that the Minister would not do so. I expressed dismay, went through the usual arguments and asked Taha Hamid to arrange for me to see the Minister myself about it as soon as possible. I reminded him that he had himself suggested that I should speak to the Minister on the subject when I took Richard Evans to call on him; but as the Minister had declined to receive me and Richard, I trusted that my present request for audience would be more successful. He said he would do his best.

2. If the invitation to Sa'ad Abdul Baqi depends on Shaikhly agreeing to see Bill Luce, the omens do not look propitious. I confess, however, that I do not myself quite see the connexion. As I see it, we want Bill Luce to see Shaikhly and we want Sa'ad Abdul Baqi to visit England for one and the same general reason, ie that both are in our interest. We are not advancing either ploy for the blue eyes of the Ba'ath. The Iraqis are evidently reluctant to allow Bill Luce to see Shaikhly because they see tactical disadvantage in being closely associated with our policy-making in the Gulf; and they presumably reason in their curious way that if our intentions in the Gulf, as explained to them by Bill Luce, are not to their taste they would either have to attack them publicly or give the appearance of condoning them; and they would say that they do not wish to do either of these things. Hence, no doubt, their insistence once again that Luce should only be received at official level.

3. Their reasoning may be stupid or unconvincing, or both; but I cannot see that it has any direct bearing on the desirability or otherwise of inviting the Iraqi Minister of Education to England - something which you and we have surely been recommending because we see advantage in it for the United Kingdom.

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4. If I do see Shaikhly and persuade him of the error of his ways I will, of course, let you know as a follow-up to this letter. But if, as is much more likely, I am unsuccessful, I hope that the invitation to Sa'ad Abdul Baqi can be reexamined as a quite separate issue and a favourable decision be reached.

Very much

Yours

H G Balfour Paul

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22


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YPHER CAT/A

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FM BAGDHAD 200530Z

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TO ROUTINE F C O TELNO 580 OF 20/5

⁽²⁾
MY LETTER 3/4 OF 8 MAY TO EGERTON : VISIT BY IRAQI MINISTER.

1. I HAVE STILL NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO URGE HIM TO RECEIVE LUCE, WHO IS THEREFORE NO LONGER COMING HERE (DUBAI TELNO 4 OF 17 MAY)

2. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER INVITATION TO MINISTER OF EDUCATION CAN NONETHELESS RECEIVE FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION.

BALFOUR PAUL

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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Mr. Parsons

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS: MINISTERIAL VISITS

1. You asked to see Mr. Godber's comment on our ~~statement~~ *submission* proposing that the Iraq Minister of Education should be invited to Britain as an official guest of HMG in September or October. Mr. Renwick's minute is attached at 7/19.

Flag A

[below]

2. Meanwhile, Mr. Balfour-Paul has written (his letter 7/21 of 8 May) arguing forcefully that he does not see that there is any connection between the Al Rawi invitation and the Iraqi decision whether to receive Sir W Luce or not at Ministerial level. I am sure this is right; it is Sir W Luce's assessment of Iraqi attitudes to our Gulf policy as a whole which Mr. Godber would like to consider, after Sir W Luce gets back from his present visits to the region.

3. But as the Ambassador goes on to argue in his letter, even if the Iraqis maintain their present ambivalent approach to our Gulf policy, that should not affect our decision whether or not to invite an Iraqi "technician" Minister who specialises in a field where Anglo/Iraqi relations have recently been making some progress.

4. Meanwhile I think we need not send Baghdad a reply.

S L Egerton
Arabian Department
14 May 1971

I agree. I think perhaps the quickest course would be for you to discuss this problem with Sir W Luce in Bahrain.

On Acland.

14/5

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NEQ 3/548/1
2
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PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A

RESTRICTED

FM F C O 211600Z

(NEQ 3/548/1)

RESTRICTED
TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 627 OF 21 MAY.

⁽²²⁾
YOUR TELNO 582: VISIT BY IRAQI MINISTER.

YOU WILL BE GLAD TO HEAR THAT WE HAVE NOW CONSULTED SIR W. LUCE
AND ALSO THE POLITICAL RESIDENT. NEITHER SEE OBJECTION TO THE
PROPOSAL TO INVITE DR. AL RAWI. WE SHALL ACCORDINGLY BE
SUBMITTING TO MINISTERS AND HOPE TO LET YOU KNOW THE OUTCOME
SHORTLY.

DOUGLAS-HOME

F I L E S
NED
MR PARSONS

RESTRICTED

✓

NEQ 3/548/1
25

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PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

(NEQ 3/548/2)

FM F.C.O. 221140Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TEL NO 632 OF 22 MAY.

MY TEL NO 627. (23)

FOR "SUBMITTING" IN THIRD SENTENCE, PLEASE READ
"RE-SUBMITTING".

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES
N.E.D.
MR PARSONS

parls

25

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TOP COPY

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 290830Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 628 OF 29/5.

RECEIVED IN REGISTER No. 10 - 1 JUN 1971 NEQ 3/548/1

YOUR TELNO 627 : ²³VISIT BY IRAQI MINISTER.

1. DR AL RAWI THREW A LARGE LUNCH YESTERDAY TO MARK THE SIGNATURE OF OUR AGREEMENT OVER THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING INSTITUTE. I AM DUE TO GIVE A RETURN DINNER ON 7 JUNE. IT WOULD BE NICE IF I COULD TELL HIM OF THE INVITATION (IF IT IS FORTHCOMING) ON THIS OCCASION.

BALFOUR PAUL


FILES
NED
MR PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

FFFFF

See reply
p. 7/6

CONFIDENTIAL



26

Mr. Parsons

*AS*²/_r
Mr Evans - we discussed.

VISIT OF IRAQI MINISTER OF EDUCATION

1. The Minister of State wanted to have Sir William Luce's views on this proposal, and you asked me to consult him during my visit to Bahrain.
2. Sir William Luce saw no objection. Nor did Mr Arthur.

A A Acland

A A Acland
Arabian Department

21 May 1971

c.c.

Mr Renwick
Mr Evans
Mr Egerton

Min. Se.

R.E.

2/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

page 7/6

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -7 JUN 1971 NEQ 3/548/1
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(27)

Mr Egerton ✓ *R 2/5*

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS : MINISTERIAL VISITS

- Flag A 1. HM Ambassador Baghdad has enquired whether the question of a visit by the Iraqi Minister of Education can receive favourable consideration even though Sir William Luce is not going to visit Baghdad (Baghdad telegram No 580).
- Flag B 2. In the light of Mr Renwick's minute of 3 May, Mr Acland
Flag C discussed with both Sir William Luce and Mr Arthur in Bahrain the possibility of a visit to this country by the Iraq Minister of Education. Sir William Luce saw no objection. Nor did Mr Arthur.
- Flag D 3. I therefore recommend that, for the reasons outlined in
Flag E Mr Egerton's minute of 29 April and Mr Balfour Paul's letter of 8 May, ~~that~~ Mr Al Rawi be invited to this country as a guest of HMG. I submit a draft letter to the Government Hospitality Fund and a draft telegram to Baghdad.

Veronica Beckett

Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department

21 May 1971

Encs


*We discussed with Mr Evans today.
2. I have sent a holding telegram
to Baghdad
3. Pl. resubmit as suggested
by Mr Evans early next week.*

*Miss Beckett
has seen.*

R.E. 2/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

*S. Egerton 21
per 15716 5*



mining & steel 28
1 agree - subject to the reservation in para 2 of Mr Parsons' note - with which I also agree.
3/6.

Mr ~~Parsons~~

Copies to:

Mr Acland
 Mr Hope-Jones

Mr Stewart
 Mr Egerton

m. m. clem

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS: VISIT BY AN IRAQI MINISTER TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

- Flag A 1. In his minute of 29 April, Mr Egerton recommended that Dr Saad Al-Rawi, the Iraq Minister of Education, should be invited to this country as a guest of the Government. The
- Flag B Minister of State commented that he would prefer to wait until Sir William Luce returned from the Gulf before deciding whether such an invitation should issue. Mr Acland discussed the subject with Sir William Luce in Bahrain. Sir William Luce
- Flag C said he saw no objection to an invitation being issued; nor did the Political Resident, who was also present. The Embassy at Baghdad have been told this.
- Flag A 2. Since Mr Egerton wrote his minute, an agreement has been
- Flag D signed in Baghdad by Dr al Rawi and HM Ambassador about the establishment of an English Language Teaching Institute (ELTI) in Baghdad. This Institute will become part of the Iraqi Ministry of Education. It will hold courses for teachers of English in schools in Iraq to brush up their command of the language and also to introduce them to new techniques of teaching it. The Institute will also undertake research into ways of improving English language teaching in Iraq. Finally, it will assist in the development of text books for English teaching at all school levels in Iraq.

*See tel to Brad
 p. 11*

CONFIDENTIAL

3. The project is to be financed from a fund of ID 150,000 (a sum which we paid over 15 years ago in settlement of claims by the Iraqi government). The Iraqi Minister of Education and HM Ambassador are joint signatories of the Institute's bank account, and it is obviously important that they should work harmoniously together. Dr al Rawi is a teacher by profession. He has taken a keen interest in the establishment of the Institute and has consistently worked for progress towards agreement on its functions. He is keen that the project should now be successful and is likely therefore to follow its progress closely. It is obviously desirable to win and keep his goodwill.
4. The British Council is also closely involved. It is in our longer term interest that English should be accurately spoken and comprehended by as many people as possible in Iraq. Additionally, a regular and reliable market in Iraq for English text books would be a useful and continuing (if undramatic) source of foreign exchange.
5. Against this background, I recommend that Dr al Rawi be invited to this country as a guest of the Government sometime in September or October; and that the attached letter to the Government Hospitality Fund be despatched. It would be helpful if a decision could be taken in time for us to authorise Mr Balfour Paul to issue the invitation at the dinner he is giving for Dr al Rawi to mark the ELTI agreement on 7 June. Arabian and Cultural Relations Departments concur.

R. M. Evans

R M Evans
Near Eastern Department

2 June 1971

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL


/I agree

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Renwick

I agree. I would not recommend inviting any of the leading military Ba'athists in Iraq in the present state of Anglo/Iraqi relations but I think that Dr. Al-Rawi's case is different and that there would be value to us from such a visit.

2. However, I would like to enter the reservation which I made when the papers were last submitted. If the Iraqis commit any major excesses between now and the time of the visit, e.g., the hanging of more Jews or a resumption of repression of the Kurds or if they open up with powerful propaganda blasts against us over e.g., the Persian Gulf, I think that we should be prepared to withdraw the invitation.



A D Parsons

3 June 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

4 June, 1971

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has agreed that the Minister of Education of Iraq should be invited to visit the United Kingdom as a guest of Her Majesty's Government.

I should be grateful for your Minister's agreement that Dr. Sa'as al-Rawi should be received as an official guest of HMG sometime during October. I understand that your Visits Section has already indicated informally that you would find this timing convenient.

We have been in touch with Mrs. Thatcher's Private Office. She is content that Dr. al-Rawi should be invited as a guest of HMG (rather than as a guest of herself). We hope that the period between 6 - 13 October would be convenient to you, as this would be the most suitable time for her to help with entertaining Dr. al-Rawi.

We should be grateful if you could let us have a reply fairly early on 7 June as HM Ambassador at Baghdad is entertaining Dr. al-Rawi to dinner that evening and would like to issue the invitation then.

(Sgd.) I. McCluney

W. J. M. Paterson, Esq., C.M.G.,
Government Hospitality Fund,
2 Carlton Gardens,
London S.W.1.

Copies to PS to Mrs Thatcher
Mrs Goodfellow
Dof C & S.

CONFIDENTIAL

See tel to Bdad
JAL

FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

(NE)

TOP COPY 30

PHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

FM F C O 071110Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO FLASH BAGHDAD TELNO 698 OF 7 JUNE INFO SAVING TO TEHRAN, KUWAIT, JEDDA, AMMAN, CAIRO, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV AND PARIS.

25

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 628: VISIT BY IRAQI MINISTER OF EDUCATION.

1. MINISTERS HAVE NOW GIVEN THEIR APPROVAL TO THE ISSUE OF AN INVITATION TO DR AL-RAWI TO VISIT THE UK IN THE AUTUMN AS A GUEST OF HMG (RATHER THAN AS A GUEST OF THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION).

THE TIME PREFERRED WOULD BE BETWEEN 6 AND 13 OCTOBER WHEN WE HOPE MRS THATCHER WOULD BE ABLE TO HELP WITH ENTERTAINING DR AL-RAWI. PLEASE THEREFORE INFORM HIM OF THE INVITATION AND REPORT HIS REACTION.

2. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION MINISTERS APPROVAL IS SUBJECT TO IRAQI ABSTENTION, IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, FROM ANY MAJOR EXCESSES, E.G. THE HANGING OF JEWS, OR A RESUMPTION OF THE REPRESSION OF THE KURDS, OR THE OPENING OF A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST HMG OVER THE PERSIAN GULF.

3. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE ON PUBLICITY.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NED
CRD
ARABIAN D
NEWS D
N AFR D

COPIES TO:

PS TO MINISTER OF EDUCATION
MISS M E GOODFELLOW, D OF E & S.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

Mr. Gertch

Mr. Evans, has seen.

GTF have agreed that Dr. Al-Rawi may be invited: I have spoken to them on the telephone & they are willing to confirm. I submit a draft tel.

Bellett

7/6

My view is that §2 c? best go in a Personal letter from Mr Evans to the Ambassador. It wd. not look good in the telegram Distribution.

J. H. Martin

7/6

Tel amended by Mr. Evans and despatched. 11.8.7/6

per 7/6

Mr. McClurey,

A new see new

Foreign and Commonwealth Office para. on

letter to ~~the~~ GTF

which has been
cleared with Mrs.

Thatcher's Office by
Mr. Rennie.

Mr Evans

Beckett + 1/6

I'm sure Sops wd

be happy with the Godbers
recommendation - but

it might be helpful now
to consult the D.E.S.

We will certainly write
to GTF if you wish - but
we would want to say that
DES agree, & copy the letter
to them.

1 NP 3/6



NEO

31

2 CARLTON GARDENS
LONDON, S.W.1

01-839 6272

11 June 1971

Ref: GHF A.1398

Ian McCluney Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 14 JUN 1971
NEW 8/548/1

Alan Lam

29

Thank you for your letter of 4 June proposing that Dr ~~Sa'ad~~ Abdul Baqi al Rawi, Minister of Education for Iraq should be invited to visit this country as a guest of Her Majesty's Government during October 1971.

My Minister agrees that the cost of this visit, including any official entertainment, should be met from the Government Hospitality Fund.

W J M Paterson

W J M PATERSON

P/W

Al-Rawi was sacked on
14/6. he must await HMA's
advice. pm 16.15/6

Handwritten signature
N ZC ZC ZL ZL ZN ZA ZO ZG ZP

BBC B

B33 IRAQ: MINISTERIAL RESHUFFLE: EDUCATION MINISTER GOES

BAGHDAD RADIO HAS BROADCAST A REPUBLICAN DECREE ISSUED BY PRESIDENT AL-BAKR TODAY WHICH APPOINTS MURTADA AL-HADITHI AS ECONOMICS MINISTER, KHALID MAKKI AL

-HASHIMI AS TRANSPORT MINISTER:
ANWAR ABD AL-QADIR AS LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER: AND
INDUSTRY MINISTER TAHA JAZRAWI AS ACTING ECONOMY MINISTER DURING
MURTADA AL-HADITHI'S ABSENCE ABROAD.

DR. SAD ABD AL-BAQI IS RELIEVED FROM HIS POST AS EDUCATION MINISTER, AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS AHMAD ABD AL-SATTAR AL-JUWARI IS APPOINTED ACTING EDUCATION MINISTER

(CED: ACCORDING TO OUR RECORDS, HADITHI HAS BEEN MOVED FROM THE LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTRY TO THE ECONOMICS MINISTRY WHICH ONLY HAD AN ACTING MINISTER IN CHARGE.)

MF BBC MON 13/6 LSE 1904 (KY)

See tel to Baghdad p 15 16/6

Enter.
32

Handwritten flourish

CONFIDENTIAL

I take it that the (32)nd
invitation is ad functionem
rather than ad personam,
British Embassy



REG

10 JUN 1971

NEQ 3/548/1

BAGHDAD

10 June 1971

22/4

R M Evans Esq
Near Eastern Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

16.18/6
Mr Eger
Miss Becker
News Dept - Mr Wight.
Encl. 17/6
R.E.

(Though the
dismissal of Dr
Al Rawi has put
the invitation
into suspense.) 17/6

VISIT OF DR SA'AD ABDUL BAQI AL RAWI

1. Your welcome telegram No 628 reached me just as Dr Abdul Baqi arrived at my ELTI celebratory dinner party on 7 June, so I was able to tell him informally of the invitation. He seemed distinctly pleased and said that October looked at first sight a good time.
2. I have now sent a formal Note to the MFA conveying the invitation and mentioning the preferred dates.
3. Neither when talking to him nor in the Note, have I, of course, mentioned the conditions in paragraph 2 of your telegram. I would say that we were more or less safe on the first two of the "major excesses" you mentioned, to wit the hanging of Jews or resumption of "the repression of the Kurds". On the third, I would judge it highly unlikely that we could escape unscathed over our Gulf policy until October (especially since the Islands issue will presumably be coming to a head by then). However, I assume that some elasticity will be allowed before treating this as a sticking point. We could hardly cancel our invitation to a friendly Minister of Education just because of some unfriendly press comment on a subject outside his sphere?
4. As to publicity, if the Iraqi Government formally accept the invitation and this fact leaks, then I see no point in trying to dodge questions which journalists may put to News Department by refusing to confirm that an invitation has been extended. But equally, I would see no advantage in trying to stimulate publicity until much closer to the event. (In any case, presumably only the Anglo/Jewish press is likely to be at all interested until then.) So for the time being I would recommend a brief for News Department for defensive use only which merely confirmed that the Minister, who is understood to be interested in many aspects of British education, has been officially invited and went on to add that the details of the visit have still to be decided. We can have a further look at the point later.

H G Balfour Paul

CONFIDENTIAL

pub 21/6

NEQ 3/548/1

33

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY (NE)

CYPHER/CAT A.

FM FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 151320Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 732 OF 15 JUNE.

IRAQ MINISTER OF EDUCATION

1. ACCORDING TO THE BBC MONITORING SERVICE, AL-RAWI WAS DISMISSED ON 13 JUNE AND AL-JAWARI APPOINTED AS ACTING EDUCATION MINISTER.
2. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR CONFIRMATION THAT THIS IS CORRECT AND ALSO FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION IN DUE COURSE ON HOW WE SHOULD HANDLE THE OUTSTANDING INVITATION TO AL-RAWI.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

NED

CRD

MR PARSONS

SIR W LUCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

ps

34

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 170816Z

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 17 JUN 1971 NEQ 3/548/1
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TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 711 OF 17/6

YOUR TEL NO 732 : IRAQI MINISTER OF EDUCATION

1. I CONFIRM THAT AL RAWI WAS RELIEVED OF HIS MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT ON 13 JUNE AND HAS RETURNED TO BAGHDAD UNIVERSITY AS PRESIDENT. SEE MACRAE'S LETTER 1/3 OF 14 JUNE , TO VERONICA BECKETT.

(NEQ 1/2)

2. I DO NOT RECOMMEND SUBSTITUTION OF AL JAWARI , WHO IS ONLY A STAND-IN , AS GUEST OF HMG, BUT WOULD PREFER MATTER TO BE RE-EXAMINED WHEN SUBSTANTIVE APPOINTMENT IS MADE.

3. IF AL RAWI STILL SHOWS ENTHUSIASM FOR VISITING UK, WE CAN PERHAPS CONSIDER AN INVITATION FOR HIM UNDER DIFFERENT AUSPICES.

BALFOUR PAUL

FILES .
NED
CRD
MR PARSONS
SIR W LUCE

CONFIDENTIAL

Paul
17/6

CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY


BAGHDAD

35

1/9

3 June 1971

Miss V E Beckett
Near Eastern Department
FCO



De Veronica,
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT SHEETS

1. While I have no desire to stir up unnecessary work, I am curious to know what has happened to the Country Assessment Sheets exercise.

(610) (1970)
2. The last twitch we recorded was Peter Tripp's letter NEQ 3/548/1 of 28 April 1970 to my ambassador. Is the giant still slumbering? Are we ever going to see the final version? Is there anything else you wish us to do?

Yours ever,
Christopher.
A C D S MacRae

See reply

para 18/6

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

36

NEQ 1/7 s/s48/1

17 June 1971

A C D S MacRae Esq
BAGHDAD

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT SHEETS

1. Many thanks for your letter of 3 June.
2. The giant isn't really slumbering, but, being a somewhat cumbersome beast, his progress is rather slow. At present Personnel Policy Department are working on a new schema for the assessment sheets and in particular for Section II. When this has been finished all sheets will need revamping and up-dating and so we shall in due course be in touch with you about this.
3. Meanwhile I wonder if you could tell me in return what has happened to George Rolleston's impressions of Kurdistan (your letter to me of 15 May)? We should be very interested to see them.

(23) NEQ 1/3

Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department

Copy to:

Mr Midgley, Personnel Policy Dept

pm
16/6



37
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

24 June 1971

A C D S Macrae Esq
BAGHDAD

IRAQ MINISTER OF EDUCATION

1. Would you please refer to Baghdad Telegram No 711 in which the Ambassador said he would like to re-examine the question of the invitation to the Iraq Minister of Education when a new appointment has been made.

2. I realise that predictions are virtually impossible in Iraqi politics but I wonder if you have any idea when this might be: the reason being that we have not so far informed the Government Hospitality Fund or the Ministry of Education about Dr al Rawi's dismissal, and they are therefore expecting a visit from him in October. If however you think it unlikely that an Iraqi ministerial visit will take place at that time we ought to put them in the picture.

Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department

Mr Smith: If a reply comes while I am away
it may be necessary to be in touch
with the Ministry of ^{Education} ~~Education~~ (CRD wd
probably do this) and GTF (Mr Sherratt).

P 25/6

NEP 3/5416

38



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

13 July 1971

W J M Patterson Esq CMG
Government Hospitality Fund
2 Carlton Gardens
London SW1

31

In your letter GHF A.1398 of 11 June you agreed that the cost of an official visit to this country in October of the Iraqi Minister of Education should be met from the Government Hospitality Fund.

I am now writing to inform you that, because of the recent expulsion from Iraq of three members of the staff of HM Embassy, Baghdad, and for other reasons which perhaps I need not set down here, HM Ambassador has recommended that the invitation to Dr Al-Rawi should be cancelled, and we have accepted his recommendation.

Miss Dooley (CRD)

Could you let the DESS
know of the cancellation.

B Smith
Near Eastern Department

14/7

Home so done. 14/7

pa 14/7

Translation from "Al Thawra" of 12 July 1971.

"Halima" and the Old Tradition.

Undisputably, Halima is "Great" Britain, or the aged Britain, and "the old tradition" is conspiracy, ~~and~~ purchasing weak souls and moving "dummies" from behind the screen, and sometimes from ~~the~~ its front.

She (Britain) does not believe that "the Empire on which the sun never set" has become ~~unbearable~~ inexistent, as the peoples have stained the tail of the lion while it was at the top of its might, drove it away from America, Africa and Asia, and there was nothing left in its claws other than a limited ^{whose} number of countries ~~whose~~ revolutionaries are blockading it in every corner and causing injuries to it.

She insists that she is "Great" because she has a permanent "share" in the "Council of the Majors" but has forgotten that the "crown" of greatness, ~~which~~ which is similar to the crowns on the heads of emars" has tumbled from her head and has been trampled underfoot.

She is still dreaming and living in mirage and imagining that the time during which Miss "Bell" used to place in position whoever she wishes and isolated whoever she wishes could be restored through the "courage" of the seekers of fame, chair and the sterling.

^{know}
One people in Iraq who "Great" Britain is. He knows her as the one whose armies entered our country as "liberator and not conqueror". In her concept "liberation" was the substitution of the sick coloniser by a strong coloniser. We know her as Britain of Lawrence and Glubb, Britain which paved the way for the usurpation of Palestine to repeat the same deal to-day in the Arab Gulf.

We know much of Britain, much of her black (spots) and its history in relation to our people is mostly imagined as dark and more hostile.

We would not ^{be} saying anything new in stating this because the convictions of our people towards the old Empire and its feeling towards it is deeply-rooted as is the banner of the revolution deeply-rooted on the banks of "Al Rafidain" (the two Rivers) which have been expressed by the people on many occasions, the simplest of which was the feeling of wrath when they tore to bits the statue of Maude which was at a very short distance from the "Embassy".

What is new is that "Halima" has returned with all the black annals of its history to exercise the ^{worn-out} old game without realising that the giant which broke out on the morning of the 14th of July is so strong as is able to crush all ^{old} new attempts especially as it is making firm strides after the Revolution of the 17th of July.

The attempts of "Halima" the aged remind me of the story of the cat which stretches out its claws and closes its eyes believing that the people do not see him because he sees nothing. I remember this story and the story of the ostrich which puts its head in the earth for the same purpose, and remember the trap in which the lieutenants of "Halima" fell and the cheap price received by them.

Abu Shaleen.

18 JUL 1971

Britain to be scapegoat in Iraq trials

By JOHN BULLOCH, in Baghdad

BRTAIN will be cast as "the villain behind the scenes" in a series of trials of Iraqi Army officers due to be staged in Baghdad soon, a senior Iraqi official indicated yesterday.

He said to me: "We hope to be able to show in evidence the part which British officials played, and to show the world why we were forced to expel three British diplomats."

Russian-built planes flew in formation over the capital and Russian tanks rumbled through the streets yesterday as President Hassan Al-Bakr took the salute at the ceremonies marking the third anniversary of the revolution which brought the Ba'ath party to power.

'In pay of British'

But the outward display of strength and solidarity marked a deep unease in the regime. Tanks and armoured cars, and soldiers in battle array are constantly on the watch at the radio station, airport and vital ministries to make any counter-coup difficult.

The forthcoming trials will show that those precautions are not idle.

More than 200 officers, mostly below the rank of major, have been arrested in the last few months and accused of plotting against the state. To lend credibility to the charge they are said to have been in the pay of "the British Secret Service".

Ten days ago the Iraqi Government expelled three members of the British Embassy in Baghdad "for activities incompatible with their diplomatic functions." The Ambassador, Mr. H. G. Balfour Paul, could obtain no more definite accusations than that.

But the state-controlled Iraqi press quoted "Iraqi intelligence officers" as saying that the three British diplomats had been "conspiring to overthrow the Iraqi Government."

Mr. Balfour Paul said to me: "I can only assume that this method of making the accusations was used because no Iraqi diplomat could trust himself to keep a straight face while making such an outrageous remark."

From Iraqi sources, I learn that Mr. George Rawlinson, who was a First Secretary in the Baghdad Embassy, has been cast as the prime mover in the "conspiracy".

This is probably because one of his duties was to maintain contact with the Iraqi newspapers, and to help visiting correspondents. This made him particularly vulnerable, as innocent meetings with local Iraqis could easily be twisted.

The other two expelled were Major Hugh Harrison, the military attaché, and Mr. Roderick Clube, of the commercial department. All three are now in Britain.

The events which led to the expulsion of the British diplomats, and to the arrests of the army officers began in neighbouring Kuwait almost three months ago.

Air Marshal Hardan Takriti, vice-president of Iraq, was stripped of his posts and exiled in October last year. Then on March 30 he decided to pay a visit to Kuwait. Iraqi intelligence learned of his plans, and made their own preparations.

In Kuwait, he went to a hospital for a check-up, but he was mortally wounded in a hail of machinegun fire as he entered the hospital doors.

Reports of what had happened reached the Iraqi armed forces, where Air Marshal Takriti had a considerable personal following. Even politicians were upset.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

21 JUL 1971

NEQ 3/5481

Not a shot fired

So the scene was set for a new struggle in Iraq, but President Bakr's government relies on its internal intelligence service and before the army or the politicians could move, everything was known.

Army officers were arrested, retired or transferred, officials were moved out of Baghdad to remote posts in the country, and with not a single shot fired, the counter-revolution was crushed.

However, some sinister outside influence had to be found. In the past, the Americans, the Persians and the Israelis have all been used for similar purposes. This time, it was the turn of Britain, so the three British diplomats had to go.

P.W.

20/7

New Yorker Depsr.

F-20



RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 14 JUL 1971 <i>NEQ3/5481</i>

With the compliments of

CHANCERY

Asm

(ref. our tel. no. 823)

BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

pa 147



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

Main copy on
NEQ2/2

30 September 1971

41

His Excellency
Mr H G Balfour Paul CMG
Baghdad

COMMUNIST BLOC PENETRATION OF IRAQ

1. As Richard Evans said in his letter to you of 4 August, we have been thinking very carefully about the points raised in your most interesting letter and Memorandum of 24 July. This reply sets out the collective views of all concerned.

Soviet Bloc activities and intentions

2. On this general question, we agree with you that all the evidence suggests that the Bloc - and the Russians in particular - have decided to devote increased attention to Iraq. The Russians have probably concluded that they should make the most of their chances and build up their position there, while hoping to avoid if possible the mistakes they have made in some other "third world" countries by becoming too dependent on one man. They may see the prospects in Iraq as better than elsewhere in the Arab world because of Iraq's relative isolation from the mainstream of Arab politics; because Iraq (in contrast to Egypt) does not live at a high level of tension with Israel; and because Iraq is apparently set on a fairly steady anti-Western course. The Russians may politically see Iraq in the longer term as an alternative power base in case Egypt turns sour on them, no doubt after some sort of accommodation with Israel over Sinai. Finally, the Russians must set store on their relations with Iraq in the context of its position at the head of the "warm waters" of the Gulf.

3. This said, we question whether the dangers of the situation are quite as great, at least in the short term, as you imply both in your Memorandum and in your letter to Evans of 20 August. Iraq is after all still very far from being a satellite. The Russians are not working through a Communist party, but through a political party most of whose aims and ideals are entirely alien to those of Communism or of individual members of the Bloc. The Russians may be able to ensure a certain degree of Iraqi dependence by providing arms and soft loans; but they are not yet in a position to exercise a veto on any particular Iraqi policy. After their experiences in both Egypt and Sudan, they will be careful not to over-commit themselves; and they must realise that it is no easy task to exert decisive influence on Iraqi policies. Nothing suggests that they regard the present or any foreseeable Iraqi regime as reliable. We expect cautious

pub, 1/10



opportunism to be the guiding principle of Soviet policy, unless the Russians suddenly feel impelled by developments elsewhere in the Arab world, or in Iraq itself, to protect their existing stake. You will remember that the conclusions of the JIC paper on Soviet Involvement in Iraq of 29 April (JIC(A)(71)(N)77) were along these general lines. Seen from here, these judgments remain valid. We wonder, however, whether you think there is a case for re-examining them.

4. So much for Soviet attitudes. What of our own? Do events and developments in Iraq matter to us? To this the answer is unequivocally yes. We have considerable interests in Iraq. First, there is oil. We must do what we can to ensure that Iraqi oil reaches the West without interruption; and we have responsibilities towards IPC, a British registered company, which we should as far as possible protect against harassment. Then we would not wish to see Iraq fall completely under the indirect domination or exclusive influence of a hostile power, thus depriving us of any opportunity - however small - to influence the Iraq Government over their activities in Kuwait or the Gulf. The same applies, although to a lesser degree, in the context of the Arab/Israel dispute. We do not, therefore want (nor can we afford) to wash our hands of Iraq. We may not like the present regime. But it seems they are there to stay. We must therefore make the best of the situation and, in particular, do what we can to prevent any increase in the present degree of their hostility towards the West.

5. We should also do all we can with our limited resources to preserve the goodwill which is felt towards this country and towards most things British by many educated Iraqis in the ranks of the upper and middle management of the country. There are two reasons why we should do this. First, we should aim to sustain the propensity of these people to make decisions or recommendations in our favour when they dare. Secondly, we should do so to invest against the day when the Ba'athists themselves might become better disposed towards us (although we think it unrealistic to suppose that we shall ever see in the measurable future an actively pro-Western regime in Iraq).

6. Against this background, we have considered what we might do to improve our links with the Iraqi regime. An effort on the Bloc scale is obviously out of the question for us. We do not have resources to mount an operation which could compete. But the following is an analysis of the possibilities open to us.

(i) Arms Sales

Arms sales to Iraq must be considered in the context of our relations with both Iran and Kuwait. We cannot therefore afford a major arms sales drive to Iraq. But we have, I think, been reasonably forthcoming about arms sales to Iraq. The Iraqis have made numerous enquiries, for most of which we have given political approval (e g for Sea King helicopters, Vosper



Thornycroft patrol boats and training jets). Our most up to date listing of Iraqi enquiries which we have turned down is at Annex A. Only two orders (for 3 Ground Controlled interception Simulators and 3 Islander Aircraft) have been forthcoming. The Iraqis may find our prices and credit terms unattractive, but we do not discriminate against them except occasionally on security grounds, and there they are in the same boat as dozens of other countries. We shall continue to meet their requests wherever possible.

(ii) Military training

Our understanding is that although the equipment of the Iraqi armed forces is mainly Bloc-supplied, their organisation still remains largely along British lines. We think this link should be preserved as long as possible and therefore attach importance to providing Iraqis with training places. The list below shows that we have been more than reasonably forthcoming, even if, as you say in paragraph A6 of your Memorandum, the Iraqis are dissatisfied with what we can offer them:

a. Naval Training

No naval training has been asked for by Iraq. The Ministry of Defence did arrange for an attachment for a civilian from the Iraqi Ports Administration to their salvage yard from April to August 1971.

b. Army Training

The Army training places allocated to Iraq and attachments are listed in Annex B. As you know Iraqis have of late been excluded from Staff courses on security grounds, but we have now persuaded the Ministry of Defence to accept an Iraqi at Camberley in 1972. It is doubtful whether places will be available in 1973 and 1974; but we can take this up again with the Ministry of Defence in due course and we doubt if the present nil forecast for 1973 and 1974 is final. As regards places at Sandhurst and Mons, which we regard as second only in importance to Camberley, the figures for overseas cadets (bids in brackets, allocations open) are:

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
<u>Sandhurst overall</u>	(70) 35	(75) 48	(104) 41
Iraq	(6) 2	(4) 3	(10) 2
<u>Mons overall</u>	(154) 75	(146) 80	(182) 80
Iraq	(10) 4	(3) 3	(20) 4

These figures may help in explaining to the Iraqis how oversubscribed these courses are.

c. Air Force Training

The Air Force training bids and places allocated are listed



in Annex C. As in the case of the Army we have obtained a place for an Iraqi at RAF Staff College Bracknell in 1972, but we cannot guarantee a regular place.

Thus, whatever the Iraqis themselves may think, they have in fact had a proportionately large slice of the cake. They have been treated at least as well as our other Arab customers and better than the North African countries. In 1970/71 we allocated £2,000 from our Military Training Assistance Scheme fund for Iraqi training, which was spent on pre-Sandhurst English language courses. This year we doubled the allocation, which we understand will also be spent on English Language courses. We shall continue to look carefully at Iraqi applications for places and to give them as favourable treatment as possible.

(iii) Culture

This again is a sphere to which we attach great importance and in which we think our record is not bad. We have heard from various sources, and have no reason to doubt, that there are more students from Iraq in this country than from any other Arab country. Unfortunately, the exact figures are not available; many of the students are here on oil scholarships or privately funded - like President Bakr's son (who by the way appears to have improved his performance recently at the Bell School at Cambridge). The British Council figure for Iraqi students during 1970 is 700, but of course they do not process by any means every student coming to this country. The British Council have written to their Representative, asking him to obtain in good time details of the British university staff needed by the Iraqis so that some can be recruited for the academic year beginning September 1972. They also promote exchanges (these have been particularly successful recently in the medical field) and links with university faculties over here. As you know, it is hoped to arrange collaboration between Baghdad University and the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, though with all the upheavals at the former, progress has been slow. The Professor of Semitic Studies at Cardiff is already a Visiting Professor at the University of Mosul. The Council have also been informed by their Representative that the Iraqis are interested in forming other links and they are awaiting further details. The English Language Teaching Institute seems to be going ahead well, after an unavoidable delay caused by the resignation of the Minister with whom you negotiated the agreement. The only point on which we have failed is the question of "cultural manifestations". The cancellation of the "Hamlet" production was most regrettable, but we hope it will be possible to provide an alternative manifestation in the fairly near future.

(iv) Commerce

Here it is disappointing to notice that there has been a slight decline in the value of British exports. We wonder whether there is any scope for an increased information effort on the commercial side. Perhaps, too, you might like to suggest names of influential



businessmen for a visit sponsored by Information Administration Department, since there may be some hold-up due to lack of funds for DTI visitors.

On the line of credit, we hope that the present negotiations will be successfully concluded. As you know, discussions about the interest rate for export credit cover are continuing here and we shall keep you informed of developments.

(v) Oil

We should, of course, like to see the IPC settle their problem over Law 80 with the Iraqis and recognise that this could make a contribution to better bilateral relations generally, as well as reducing the area of opportunity for Soviet penetration. But it would be unrealistic to suppose that we could or should press the IPC to take a softer line with the Iraqis, or that a more forthcoming posture by the Company would lead to anything other than further Iraqi demands. Frankly, I can see little hope of improvement in this sphere. It is really depressing that, after all the concessions made by the IPC over prices etc in recent months, their refusal to meet Iraqi demands for capacity utilisation of the pipeline and/or yet another loan should be met by Ammash's petulant cancellation of the talks planned for next month. These bilateral oil problems may be further exacerbated by the participation issue, in which Iraq appears to be on the side of the hawks.

We have taken up again with IPC the question of their reluctance to let British exporters conclude contracts with Iraqi institutions which might increase INOC's potential to exploit Rumaila or other expropriated oil, but so far with no success.

(vi) Aid

As you know, Iraq does not qualify for capital aid as her per capita national income is too high. There is at present no prospect of any change in this position.

(vii) Technical Assistance

We think this is an area where our effort might be increased and agree in general with the views put forward by MacRae in his letter of 26 July to Cook in the ODA. We have discussed this with Cook, who has agreed to look again at the ODA programme which might be adopted, e.g. export-orientated assistance (see iv above). To this end, we wonder whether it might be worthwhile asking DEVDIV to send a team out to Baghdad to see if any useful projects could be identified. We should be grateful for your views. We should also like to know whether you think the time has yet come for a review of the ODA policy of not providing exports on long contracts for Iraq.

(viii) Visitors

We do not think that the time is propitious for a Ministerial visit either way. The proposal for a visit by the Iraqi Minister



of Education was a casualty and we doubt whether any of our own Ministers would be willing to go to visit Baghdad officially at present. We shall, however, bear both these possibilities in mind. On the other hand, we do think that the sponsored (inward) visits programme for Iraq might be stepped up. As you know, Information Administration Department would be happy to accept Iraqis on official visits and look forward to having proposals from you in the fairly near future. We realise that there may have been some disinclination in the past either for you to recommend or for us to accept active Baath Party members on such visits. But if we are to cut any ice with the regime we think that, subject to your views, we shall have to make a real effort to cultivate middle rank Baathists on the way up from now on. Are there for instance any Mutasarrifs or Under-Secretaries in any of the Ministries who might be suitable candidates this winter, or for the spring/summer season?

7. You talked in your Memorandum about the possibility of establishing a "stronger Western lifeline" for Iraq. We have considered whether we should promote discussions on Iraq with other European countries. We have concluded that, although it would be unwise to suggest discussions in NATO (over and above the normal exchanges in the six monthly meeting of NATO "Middle East experts") we might take a suitable opportunity to exchange views on Iraq in talks with either the French or the Germans. We shall also bear in mind the possibility of raising Iraq at the Permanent Representatives' Council of the WEU, which meets fortnightly in London at Ambassadorial level. We do not, however, hold out much hope of achieving anything concrete by such discussions, which (on past experience) quickly degenerate into "gloom groups".

8. To sum up, therefore, we should like to increase our modest effort in Iraq, but not, as you say, at the cost of a dramatic change in our Middle East priorities. We think the most promising areas of activity are likely to be culture (in particular English Language teaching), commerce, sponsored visits, and military training.

9. We wonder what you think about all this and look forward to having your comments when you have had time to think things over. I apologise for the length of this letter, but hope that you will take it at the same time as an index of our interest in a fascinating, if maddening, country.

A D Parsons

P.S. Richard Evans will be signing on my behalf as I shall be on the way to New York for a week before the letter has been typed in

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form. Not often that I write at such length but we really have had an exhaustive run through all aspects of our relations with Iraq.

Copied to:

Chanceries:

Amman
Beirut + DevDiv
Cairo
Jedda
Kuwait
Khartoum
Tripoli
Algiers
Rabat
Bahrain Resy
Tehran
Moscow
Paris
Washington
UKMis New York
Tel Aviv (with copy of Memorandum and Mr Balfour Paul's
letter of 20 August)

[EESD
Arabian Dept
N African D
WED
WOB
CRD
Defence D
EPD
FPAD
IAD
Oil D
Assessment Staff]



Military Equipment we have refused to Supply and Why

Armour Piercing Weapons

Conical Charges

Anti-Personnel Mines:

Fragmentation

Booby-Trap

Plastic

Flame Throwers and Cartridges

Accurate Snipers' Rifles:

Semi Automatic with Telescopic
Sights

Cymbeline

Jaguar

2 B298 Ground
Surveillance Radar

PRC 320

MOD objection

MOD Operational Objection

Political and Security
objection to sale before
1975

Demonstrated in Lebanon
and seen by Iraqis.
Operational objection
to sale before 1973/74

Demonstration authorised,
but operational objection
to sale at this time

ANNEX B



IRAQI ARMY TRAINING IN UK: 1970-1972

		From	To
1 English Language	OE 16	8. 1. 70	5. 6. 70
1 Plat. Cmdrs Battle	No 7	31. 3. 70	7. 6. 70
7 Offrs & SNCOs	No 85	9. 4. 70	29. 4. 70
1 " " "	No 86	cancelled by Iraq	
1 ASE	No 17	7.70 cancelled by Iraq	
1 English Language	OE 17	9. 9. 70	19. 2.71
1 English	OE 18	10. 3. 71	10. 8.71
1 Army Cmdrs Battle	No 11	13. 6. 71	23. 7.71
2 Plat. Cmdrs Battle	No 11	13. 6. 71	22. 8.71
4 English Language	OE 19	6. 9. 71	6. 2.72
1 Regtl. Signal Offrs.	No 9	20. 9. 71	10.12.71
2 cadets Overseas English		Mar 72	Aug 72
2 soldiers Bandmasters		1974-1	& 1975-1
2 officers Medical Supply Course		early 1972	
1 officer Observation of Fire Course		26.9.71	8.10.71

Iraq has also asked for a place on the Security, Staff Intelligence and Air Photo Reading courses at the Intelligence Centre. These are "Oversubscribed Courses" for which places will be allocated at a special MOD meeting in October 1971.

ATTACHMENTS

1 Depot Para. Regt	21. 6.71	30. 6.71
1 HQ REME 3 Div.	21. 6.71	30. 6.71
1 HQ RA 3 Div. SLR	21. 6.71	30. 6.71
1 3 Med. Rgt. RA	21. 6.71	30. 6.71
1 HQ Engineering Bde	18.10.71	27.10.71
1 12 Light Rgt. RA	18.10.71	27.10.71
1 3 Divn. HQ Signal Rgt.	18.10.71	27.10.71
1 Lt. Col. HQ Airportable Bde	18.10.71	27.10.71
1 Lt. Col. HQ 3 Divn. RA	18.10.71	27.10.71



IRAQ AIR FORCE TRAINING IN UK 1970-72

1970 - FLYING

<u>Bid or Enquiry</u>	<u>Detail</u>	<u>Result</u>
B	2 places on QHI Course	Places allocated and taken up
B	1 place on Navigation Course	Place allocated and taken up. Student subsequently recommended for suspension and withdrawn
B	1 place on Navigation Course	Place allocated and taken up

1971 - FLYING

B	1 place on IRE (Hunter) Course	Place allocated but bid subsequently changed to multi-engined.
B	2 places on IRE (Multi-engined) course	No such course. Possible alternatives put to IAF Director of Training and reply awaited
B	2 places on specialist "Survey Navigation" course	No suitable RAF Course available. Being advised of civilian firm who can provide suitable course

1972 - FLYING

B	2 places on QHI Course	Places allocated and nominations received
B	20 places on ab-initio pilot courses	To await allocations of available F and C slots for 1972
B	4 places on "CFS" course	IAF asked to clarify whether for QFI or QHI and on what type of aircraft
B	2 places on PAI Course	IAF advised no places available in foreseeable future.



1970 - GROUND COURSES

<u>Bid or Enquiry</u>	<u>Details</u>	<u>Result</u>
B	1 place on Diploma in Aviation Medicine Course	Allocated and taken up. Various post-course attachments arranged.
B	2 places on Supply Officers Course	Places offered but declined (no reason given)
B	Attachment for MO to CME	Agreed and took place
B	IAF authorities bid for 2 places at Staff College	Iraq not included among countries invited to bid (on security grounds) and nothing further heard
B	4-10 places on ATC course	No places available. 1971 position to be reviewed. Subsequently 2 places allocated but only 1 student acceptable after aptitude testing.

1971 - GROUND COURSES

B	2 places on Overseas Officers Mech Eng Course	Places allocated and taken up
	1 place on O'seas Officers E and I Course	Places allocated and taken up
	1 place on O'seas Officers Armament Course	Place allocated, but not taken up because no Iraqi student educationally acceptable
E	6 places on 8 week refresher courses for Technical Officers	No such courses run by RAF
E	6 enquiries addressed in Jan 1971 to ODR by Iraqi Attache in London	Answers in brief for Secretary of State
	a. QFI Course	No places available in 1971 - further details needed
	b. RAF Staff College	Iraq invited to bid
	c. Flight Engineer Course	Places available. Subsequently discovered that this was wrong description for technical officer courses already provided



1971 - GROUND COURSES (CONTD)

<u>Bid or Enquiry</u>	<u>Details</u>	<u>Result</u>
E	d. Instrument Rating Examiner	Could be done given sufficient notice
	e. Fighter Controller Course	No vacancies until 1973
	f. Operational Conversion Course	Assuming this is for the Hunter, no places available
E	3 enquiries addressed in March 1971 to British Air Attache in Baghdad	
	a. 3 Fighter Controllers to be trained and categorised as examiners	No formal course for categorising examiners. Offered briefing in UK by MOD C & R Evaluation Team or visit to Iraq by Cat. Team
	b. 1 place on a "senior Officers staff course" for a Colonel considered too senior for Staff College	No suitable courses available within allowable security levels
	c. Visits required for 4 IAF officers to attend major air exercises as observers	Handled by FLS. No visits possible within allowable security levels.
B	1 place on Photo Interpretation Course	Place allocated. Student arrived in UK too late after course state date for acceptance
E	Details of bandmaster training courses requested	Given, and now a place is being negotiated for a course at the RAF School of Music
B	7 places on Personnel Selection Officers Courses	7 places offered. 3 taken up so far
B	2 places on Supply Officers Course	No places available in 1971 - to be notified later re 1972
B	32 places on ATC Courses to be filled as and when possible	4 places offered in 1971
B	2 places on Staff College Crse	1 place allocated. Nomination still awaited
B	3 places on Fighter Control course in connection with Solartron sale	2 places allocated and third under review

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Miss Beddelt . I agree (42)
with yr. Comment, w^d you pl. tell

ODA of our
for the idea
in § 3 - in

British Embassy
BAGHDAD

20 October 1971

6/16

J C Rowley Esq
Head of Development Division
British Embassy
BEIRUT

nec J. ?

RE 29/X

NEQ 1/5 48/1

Enter

Mr Egerton: The
suggestion that a Dev Div
team sh^d go to B'had
came from Mr Cook
himself (para 2 below).

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ

(41) 1. You will no doubt have noticed that in his letter to me of 30 September (copied to you), Tony Parsons suggested that technical assistance was a sphere in which our efforts in Iraq might be increased. He also canvassed our views on whether it might be worthwhile sending a Dev Div "team" here, to help identify possible new projects.

2. I should say, first, that we entirely agree with the view that it would be in our interest to expand our modest TA programme to Iraq somewhat. This cannot be done suddenly or spectacularly: rather, a gradual build-up of the programme along much the same line as it is following at present, would seem to me the right way to set about it. As to the visit of a "team", I suspect that Dev Div's tight programme may not allow the descent of several of your experts at once. In any case, the FCO may not have realised that Donald Davidson, Desmond Fitzgibbon and Matthew Wordsworth have all paid useful visits here this year. But I would, in general, very much welcome more Dev Div visits whenever they can be fitted in.

3. There is one specific event for which we would be glad to enlist your help if possible. Before Parsons' encouraging letter reached me, we had in any case been about to approach Miss Sirriya al-Kheja, the Director General of the Department for Culture and Technical Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the statutory channel for foreign technical assistance) to discuss next year's programme. Brian Cook of the ODA seems unlikely to visit us in time to attend this session (as his predecessor, Ken Frest, did last year). And it would distinctly strengthen our hand if one of your team could come over for the occasion. Not only would we welcome his advice on projects within his special field; but so as to convince the Iraqis that we are seriously interested in strengthening our programme, it would certainly be an advantage if Dev Div could be represented.

4. We should really see Miss Kheja as soon as possible - certainly within the next month. Is there any chance of one of your team being able to spare a few days? Ideally, of course, it would be a useful opportunity for you yourself to be introduced to Ambassador al-Kheja and to see something of a part of your parish which, I fear, you may not be able to visit much. I would certainly be delighted if you could come. Failing that, an Economist would perhaps represent the ODA rather more appropriately than a specialist

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in a narrower field.

5. In order to keep our technical assistance constantly under review, my Second Secretary, Ian Lewty, who has the task of co-ordinating the programme, has just instituted a quarterly "score card". I enclose a copy of his first edition, which I think you will find a useful introduction to our current efforts here.

H G Balfour Paul

cc **B Cook Esq**
Middle East & Mediterranean Department
ODA
Kland House
Stag Place SW1

Miss V E Beckett
Near Eastern Department
FCO

2

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TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME - AS AT OCTOBER 1971

A IRAQI TRAINERS IN OR SELECTED TO GO TO BRITAIN

I Those (going) on Academic or Similar Courses

No	File Ref	Name	Parent Body in Iraq	Function	Gone/Going to	For	(Expected) Dates of leaving and returning to Iraq		Observations
1	6/51 (70)	Madher LUFTI	Dairy Administration Abu Ghraib	I/O Matter and Cream Section	Reading University	M Sc in Food Science	4/8/70	Summer 1972	Wife and 2 children with him
2	"	Yacoub Yousif SHUNIA	"	Cost Accountant	Birmingham College of Commerce	ICWA Qualifications	8/9/70	Summer 1973	
3	6/1 and 6/34	Yuhanna Yacob ABOONA	National Centre for Consultancy and Management Development	Production Management Specialist	City University, London	M Phil in Industrial Investment	6/1/71	Late 1972	
4	6/34	Ali Abdul Hassain Al A'SAM	"	Engineer	Birmingham University	M Sc in Engineering Construction	28/9/71	Summer 1972	
5	"	Zohair Rashid Al ATTAR	"	Accountant	SW London College	ICWA Exams II - V	-	Summer 1973	Already in UK on ILO Fellowship; ODA Grant depends on success in Pt I of Exams

No	File Ref	Name	Parent Body in Iraq	Function	Gone/Going to	For	(Expected) Dates of leaving and returning to Iraq		Observations
6	6/19	Farhal Abdulla AZIZ	Ministry of Irrigation	Assistant Engineer	Southampton University	M Sc in Irrigation	15/7/71	Summer 1972	
7	"	Bashir Houri LAMMOZA	"	Super-vising Engineer	"	"	"	"	
8	"	Hajib ADAMO	"	Resident Engineer, Mandali Project	"	"	"	"	
9	6/62	Adil Said AL AUBAYDI	Ministry of Municipalities	Architect and Planner	Liverpool University	M Sc in Civic Design	29/7/71	Summer 1973	
10	6/40	Kamel Abdul Kader WALY	Ministry of Planning	Chief Engineer	Strathclyde University	Diploma in Highway and Traffic Engineering	8/8/71	Summer 1972	
11	"	Anan Emmanuel ALLOS	"	Contract Follow-up Engineer	Birmingham University	M Sc in Transportation and Traffic Planning	30/9/71	"	

No	File Ref	Name	Parent Body in Iraq	Function	Gone/Going to	For	(Expected) Dates of leaving and returning to Iraq		Observations
12	6/40	Mousa Abdul Wahab AL SAKATI	Ministry of Works and Housing	Coordinating Engineer	Strathclyde University	M Sc in Traffic and Highway Engineering	2/9/71	Summer 1972 or 1973	Likely to be followed by wife and children
13	6/53	Majid Abood Jasim AL TAI	Ministry of Higher Education	Lecturer at Basra University	Newcastle University	M Sc in Rock Mechanics	2/9/71	Summer 1972	
14	"	Khalid Abdul Azis ZAKARIA	"	Site Engineer Mosul University	Imperial College London	M Sc in Concrete Structures and Technology	Sept/Oct 1971	"	Await confirmation of place at Imperial College
15	6/67	Bakir Rassoul AL HASHIMI	Ministry of Planning (Central Statistical Organisation)	Programmer and Systems Analyst	London University	Computer Management Studies Course	30/9/71	"	Wife accompanying
16	"	Sanir Husain AL AWNI	"	"	"	"	1972	Summer 1973	Needs English Language tuition Deferred - 1972

II THOSE (GOING) ON LOWER-LEVEL COURSES

No	File Ref	Name	Parent Body in Iraq	Function	Gene/Going to	For	(Expected) Dates of leaving and returning to Iraq		Observations
1	6/64	Nasrat ARABU	Ministry of Education DG of Technical Affairs	TV Producer Cultural TV Section	Centre for Educational Development Overseas, London	ETV Producers' Course	2/9/71	Dec '71	
2	6/30	Mrs Ashar Abdul WAHHAB	PTT Administration Baghdad	Designer of Post Office Buildings	British Post Office	Training Course	Early '72	Summer 1972	Postponed from October '71 because pregnant
3	"	Ramsi Marcus SABRI	"	Asst. Engineer Building and Construction Section	"	"			English needs improvement
4	6/18	Farouk Abbas AL AZZAWI	Public Dairy Administration Baghdad	Technician in Sterilising plant	CWS Creamery Utteter; and APV Ltd., Crawley	Dairy Methods Course	19/8/71	Dec '71	

B POSSIBLE FUTURE COMMITMENTS

No	File	Field	Parent Body	Type of Training	Observations
1	6/53	Higher Education	Ministry of Higher Education	Academic	The Ministry of Higher Education were offered 3 places on the 1971/72 programme, but produced only 2 candidates good enough
2	6/40	Highway & Traffic Engineering	Ministry of Works & Housing	M Sc in Traffic & Highway Engineering, Strathclyde	Candidate (Mahsin Hussein) rejected for 71-72 but accepted for 72-73 if Iraqis wish, and his English improves
3	6/18	Dairy foods	Public Dairy Administration Abu Ghraib	M Sc in Dairy Science at Reading University for Al Neddaff	Candidate's papers gone to ODA
4	6/50	Development Planning	Ministry of Economy	Special Seminar at Sussex University April-July 1972	ODA considering Dr Abdul Wahhab Al Amin, Acting DG of Planning, for a place
5	6/41	Civil Aviation	Ministry of Communications	Courses concerned with new equipment at Baghdad International Airport	7 candidates being assessed by ODA. 1 more candidate to be nominated by Iraqis
6	"	"	"	Postgraduate training in air law	ODA have approved in principle

B POSSIBLE FUTURE COMMITMENTS

No	File	Field	Parent Body	Type of Training	Observations
7	6/27	Industrial Training	Ministry of Education (D/G of vocational guidance)	To give shopfloor experience to teachers in technical schools	Awaiting nomination of suitable candidates
8	6/64	Educational TV	Ministry of Education	Training for 2 engineers at Thomson TV College and 1 producer at GEDO and 1 graphics designer	Awaiting nomination of candidates. Offer result of Brian Kirby's visit
9	6/60	Veterinary Science	Near East Animal Health Institute, Abu Ghraib	Various veterinary fields	ODA approval in principle
10	6/48	Forestry	Ministry of Northern Affairs	Either graduate or sub-professional	Await nominations. Offer result of Davidson's visit
11	6/17	Railway Engineering	I.R.R.	Training for 4 engineers	Seeking more details
12	6/15	Dates	S.O. for dates and palms	Various	ODA approval in principle. Seeking more details

B POSSIBLE FUTURE COMMITMENTS

No	File	Field	Parent Body	Type of Training	Observations
13	6/65	Animal Husbandry	Ministry of Agriculture	4 attachments	Await ODA approval in principle
14	6/61	Agrarian Economics	Ministry of Agrarian Reform	M Sc in Cooperative Economics	Await nomination of suitable candidates
15	6/57	Ports and Harbours	Ports and Harbours Board, Basra	Hydraulics Public Health Cost & Works Accounting Hydrographic Surveying	Await ODA approval in principle. Topic raised by Chief Engineer when Fitzgibbon called on him
16	6/53	Medicine	Baghdad Medical School	Supply of books	In correspondence with ODA

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

29 October 1971

B Cook Esq
M E Division
Overseas Development Administration
Eland House
Stag Place
London S W 1

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ

1. Would you please refer to HM Ambassador to Baghdad's letter of 20 October to Mr Rowley in Devdiv, Beirut.
2. This is just to confirm that Near Eastern Department agree that it would certainly be an advantage if Devdiv could be represented at the discussions mentioned in Paragraph 3 of Mr Balfour Paul's letter. I hope this will be borne in mind when the time comes to take a decision on this.

Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department

Copies to: J C Rowley Esq
Devdiv, Beirut
Chancery
Baghdad

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[NED]

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FM BEIRUT 011000Z

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TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TEL NO 94 OF 1 ^{NOVEMBER} OCTOBER INFO ODA.
FROM DEV DIV. VISIT TO IRAQ.

- 42
1. YOUR LETTER 6/16 OF OCTOBER 20 REFERS. WE HAVE PARTICULARLY TIGHT SCHEDULE THIS MONTH BUT HUDSON COULD VISIT BAGHDAD ON NOVEMBER 16, LEAVING FOLLOWING MORNING FOR BEIRUT. HE WOULD ARRIVE EARLY MORNING FROM TEHERAN AND THUS HAVE TIME FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH EMBASSY AND WITH APPROPRIATE IRAQI OFFICIALS THAT DAY.
 2. WILL CONFIRM TIMETABLE FROM KABUL, BUT GRATEFUL FOR INDICATION WHETHER A MEETING ON NOVEMBER 16 WITH MISS KHOJA IS FEASIBLE.

WRIGHT

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~~RR ODA~~

~~GR 53~~

CYPHER

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3 NOV 1971
NEQ 6/548/1

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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 030715Z

RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY BEIRUT TELNO. 145 OF 3/11 INFO O.D.A.

FOR DEV DIV.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 94: VISIT TO IRAQ.

1. APPOINTMENT WITH SIRRIYA AL KHOJA FIXED FOR 11 AM TUESDAY, 16 NOVEMBER. GRATEFUL FOR EARLIEST CONFIRMATION THAT HUDSON CAN MAKE IT.
2. MACRAE OFFERS TO ACCOMMODATE.

BALFOUR PAUL

[See ODA]

NNNN

ph
13/11

CONFIDENTIAL




British Embassy

BAGHDAD

3/4

R M Evans Esq
Near Eastern Department
FCO



28 October 1971

Eph. min.

Mr. Egeron
Miss Becker

What do you think?
Pl. speak.
R.E. 4/11

Dear Richard,

1. During the last four months we have been adopting, in the cant phrase, a low profile here - so low indeed as to be almost invisible. The initial reason for this was the expulsions in early July and the alleged plotting by "British Intelligence". We did not wish to challenge or provoke the régime, by making too much of a fuss, into producing bogus confessions to justify their allegations. But this restraint has proved somewhat ineffective in the light of the "confessions" of Fahim Jalal on 17 September and by the promise of further stunning revelations by a Brigadier Khammas, which the Ba'ath's organs in Beirut imply will inculcate British Intelligence still further.
2. Other reasons for our low profile have been (a) our embarrassment over the Islands dilemma and (b) the removal of the RCC's two more conversable figures, Ammash and Shaikhly, and the ensuing near-vacuum in the corridors leading to the Palace - no Vice Presidents, nothing but a caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a general air of unresolved jostling for position.
3. The question in my mind is whether it is right to go on keeping our heads down quite so strenuously, on the principle of Lauderdale's advice to his Stuart master to "Juik (duck) and let the waves gang o'er ye": or whether we ought not to try again to establish some sort of dialogue with the Palace, before rather than after the next storm breaks.
4. Tony Parsons' letter of 20 October confirmed ~~by~~ ^{my} supposition that there is little or no chance of a FCO minister coming this way to try to make the Palace see reason on the Islands or anything else at issue. Faute de mieux what this letter is proposing is that I should be authorized, or better still instructed, to seek audience of Saddam Hussain and take some hair down.
5. By that I mean that I should:
 - a. Take up with him again the subject of Iraq's increasingly one-sided non-alignment and the slither to Moscow. The two conversations I had with Saddam long since on this general theme were not discouraging and would at least serve as a starting point.
 - b. Insist that we are entirely innocent of any plotting or desire to overthrow the régime and that he must be aware of this himself, confessions or no confessions.

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- c. Say to him whatever can usefully be said at that point in time about our Gulf policies. (It is because this subject would inevitably be raised by Saddam that I need your authority before applying to see him.) ?

6. I recognize the difficulties - particularly over c., since if he did respond to a request for audience, there is no knowing in advance when the call would come or what might be happening in the Gulf when it came. But I could at least count on a few days notice, which would enable me to seek further guidance quickly.

Li must be.
R.E.
4/11.
7. The fact that it is mildly distasteful to be so inactive is neither here nor there. I simply feel that it is about time we made an attempt to get to grips with these people about a. and b., even if it means an awkward passage on c. To do nothing at all may often be the best thing to do and almost certainly was in recent months. To go on doing so indefinitely may give an impression of indifference or disinterest, (which I suspect galls them), if not also of guilt on 5b. If things are going to be bad, a session with Saddam is unlikely to make them worse, and might at least provide us with some extra warning. At best, if it prospered, it might conceivably make some margin of difference to the extent to which the Iraqis vent their likely spleen on our general and commercial interests here. (They have been keeping West German and American exports to this country at an exiguous rate, for political reasons, since 1967; while letting us off, as they see it, scot free. They may, of course, continue to do the latter - though we certainly cannot count on this.)

- || 8. If you are prepared to let me go ahead, please let me know soon - preferably by telegram. It is unlikely that I could get an appointment in less than a fortnight: and not all that likely, owing to doubts about Saddam's accessibility, that I should get one at all. But I should like to try.

Yours ever
Glen
H G Balfour Paul

P.S. You will perhaps be aware that I am hoping to take a month's U.K. leave on 14 December.

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IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT -A-

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FROM KUWAIT. 031300Z NOVEMBER.
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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, TELEGRAM NUMBER 491,
DATED 3 NOVEMBER 1971., REPEATED IMMEDIATE INFO TO BAHRAIN RES-
IDENCY, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, AND TEHERAN., ROUTINE INFO TO WASHINGTON,
CAIRO, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, AND UKMIS NEW YORK.
SAVING TO DOHA, MUSCAT, AND BAHRAIN EMBASSY (BAHRAIN RESIDENCY
PLEASE PASS SAVING).

MY TEL NO 484 (NOT TO ALL):- GULF ISLANDS

THE AL KHALIJ STORY MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO HOLD ENTIRELY
TO MY INTENDED LINE OF SAYING NOTHING TO THE KUWAITIS AT THE
PRESENT STAGE. ONCE PUBLIC INTEREST IS AROUSED HERE THE PRESS
USUALLY CONTRIVE TO MANOEUVRE EITHER THE MINISTER OR THE
PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY INTO SAYING SOMETHING AND WHAT THEY ARE
LIKELY TO SAY IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS UNPREDICTABLE. I HAD
UNDERTAKEN WHEN I CALLED ON THE PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY ON 25
SEPTEMBER, TO KEEP HIM INFORMED WHEN THERE WAS ANYTHING TO TELL.
AND ON 1 NOVEMBER I MET THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
SOCIALLY AND HE QUIZZED ME ON THE ATTITUDE OF RAS AL KHAIMA
HAVING, PRESUMABLY, BY THAT TIME HEARD OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE
RULER AND SIR W. LUCE ON 30 OCTOBER. IN REPLY I HAD CONFINED
MYSELF TO SAYING THAT SIR W. LUCE WAS STILL TRYING TO EFFECT SOME
KIND OF RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF THE SHAH AND THE
RULERS CONCERNED, BUT THAT SHAIKH SAQR SEEMED TO HAVE DECIDED
THAT HE, AT ANY RATE COULD NOT MAKE ANY KIND OF COMPROMISE.

2. ON RECEIPT OF BAHRAIN RESIDENCY TELS NOS 775 TO 777 I
THOUGHT I HAD BETTER SEE THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT
(HE LISTENS BETTER THAN EITHER THE MINISTER OR PERMANENT UNDER
SECRETARY AND A VISIT TO HIS OFFICE DOES NOT ATTRACT THE AUTO-
MATIC PRESS ATTENTION THAT A VISIT TO EITHER OF THEM RECEIVES.).

CONFIDENTIAL

/3. I BEGAN

3. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT WE WERE GRATEFUL THAT THE KUWAIT AUTHORITIES HAD PROMPTLY SUPPRESSED THAT NUMBER OF AL KHALIJ., THAT KIND OF REPORTING IN THE MIDDLE OF A DELICATE NEGOTIATION COULD NOT HELP. I HAD NOT TRIED TO BRIEF THEM SOONER BECAUSE SIR. W. LUCE WAS STILL IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CURRENT ROUND. AS THE KUWAITIS WERE AWARE, HIS ROLE WAS THAT OF AN INTERMEDIARY. HE WAS TRYING TO DISCOVER A WAY TO A COMPROMISE. THERE WERE NO "LUCE" PROPOSALS.

4. ISSA AL HAMAD SAID THAT HE HAD SUPPOSED THAT SIR. W. LUCE HAD TAKEN OUT WITH HIM SOME BRITISH PROPOSALS AFTER DISCUSSING IN LONDON HIS LAST CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SHAH. I REPEATED THAT HE WAS ACTING AS AN INTERMEDIARY. H.M.G. HAD ADOPTED NO "SOLUTION" OF THE PROBLEM. WE WERE STILL WORKING FOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION RATHER THAN A SOLUTION BY FORCE. ISSA REPEATED THE STANDARD KUWAITI LINE THAT "HE COULD NOT BELIEVE" THAT THE SHAH INTENDED TO RESORT TO FORCE. I SAID THAT THAT WAS THE MAIN POINT OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR READING OF THE SITUATION AND THE KUWAITIS. OUR CONTACTS WITH THE SHAH THROUGH SIR W. LUCE AND OUR AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE SHAH MEANT WHAT HE HAD REPEATEDLY SAID IN PUBLIC: THAT HE WOULD TAKE THE ISLANDS IF HE COULD NOT GET WHAT HE WANTED BY NEGOTIATION.

5. ISSA THEN ASKED HOW ANY SUCH SETTLEMENT COULD BE EXPECTED TO LAST. FOR HOW LONG DID THE SHAH PROPOSE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD LAST? WOULD NOT HE, OR HIS SUCCESSOR DENOUNCE THEM SOONER OR LATER? I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE SHAH MEANT IT WHEN HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GENEROUS PROVIDED HE GOT WHAT HE WANTED., BUT THAT THE ONE THING WHICH SEEMED TO ME QUITE CERTAIN WAS THAT IF HE TOOK THE ISLANDS BY FORCE NEITHER HE NOR ANY FUTURE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD LET GO OF THEM AGAIN. THE CHOICE WAS THEREFORE STILL THE SAME: BETWEEN A CHANCE OF GETTING SOMETHING AND THE CERTAINTY OF LOSING EVERYTHING. THAT WAS WHY WE WERE STILL, AFTER EIGHTEEN MONTHS, PURSUING THE IDEA OF A SOLUTION BY AGREEMENT. THAT SEEMED TO US TO OFFER THE ONLY WAY OF AVOIDING A CONFRONTATION.

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6. ISSA THEN REFLECTED GLOOMILY ON THE EFFECT AN IRANIAN SEIZURE OF THE ISLANDS WOULD HAVE ON ANGLO-ARAB RELATIONS. PEOPLE WOULD POINT OUT THAT IT WAS WE WHO HAD SOLD THE SHAH TANKS AND MODERN AIRCRAFT. I SAID THE TANK AND AIRCRAFT WERE IRRELEVANT TO THE PROBLEM OF THE ISLANDS. THE SHAH COULD THEM ELSEWHERE IF WE REFUSED AND NEITHER OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAN NOR THE ARAB POSITION IN REGARD TO THE ISLANDS WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPROVED.

7. ISSA THEN SAID THAT THE AMIR HAD URGED PRESIDENT SADAT, DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE SHAH TO BE REASONABLE., AND HE MENTIONED, SOMEWHAT OBSCURELY, THE REPLACEMENT OF ZAHEDI. I SAID THE SHAH NO DOUBT THOUGHT THAT HE WAS BEING REASONABLE, EVEN GENEROUS. BUT I THOUGHT HE WAS AS DETERMINED AS EVER. I DID NOT THINK THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF ZAHEDI INDICATED A CHANGE OF POLICY. THE SHAH MIGHT AT ONE POINT HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD THE ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT SADAT AND OF KING FAISAL BUT I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT EVEN IF THOSE MISAPPREHENSIONS HAD BEEN CLEARED UP HE HAD BEEN DISSUADED FROM HIS INTENTION TO HAVE THE ISLANDS ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.

8. ISSA ASKED IF THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED FOR ABU MUSA FOR SOME SORT OF JOINT OCCUPATION ALSO APPLIED TO THE TUNBS. I SAID I THOUGHT NOT. SO FAR AS I KNEW THE SHAH HAD NEVER PROPOSED ANYTHING IN RESPECT OF THE TUNBS OTHER THAN THAT HE WOULD PAY GENEROUSLY PROVIDED THE RULER ABANDONED THEM TO HIM.

9. HE THEN ASKED WHAT, IF THERE WERE A JOINT OCCUPATION OF ABU MUSA, WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON THE TERRITORIAL WATERS. I SAID I SUPPOSED THAT QUESTION WOULD NEED TO BE NEGOTIATED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EVENTUAL NEGOTIATION OF A MEDIAN LINE FOR THE WHOLE GULF, WHICH AT PRESENT HAD BEEN DELINEATED FOR ONLY A SMALL PART OF ITS TOTAL LENGTH.

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12. IN CONCLUSION HE UNDERTOOK TO INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF WHAT I HAD SAID, AND I REPEATED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD ADOPTED NO SET OF PROPOSALS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM AND THAT SIR W. LUCE WAS STILL TRYING TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD COMMAND GENERAL AGREEMENT.

WILTON.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

47

A C D S MacRae Esq
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference NEQ 3/548/1

Date

8 November 1971

COUNTRY ASSESSMENT SHEETS

1. Would you please refer to my letter of 17 June. You will be glad to hear that the giant has lurched into life.
2. I enclose a copy of revised guidance notes for the preparation of these sheets, together with a copy of a new form for Section II. We should be grateful if you could update Sections I, II and III of the Sheet, in accordance with the guidance notes, by mid-December. Meanwhile we will update Section IV here.
3. Just to warn you, we shall have to look at all this again in preparation for your Inspection next autumn.

Veronica Beckett
Near Eastern Department

Enc

pub 8/12

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12 NOV 1971
NEQ 3/948/1

48

~~Mr Evans~~

Mr Parsons

Mr Parsons.

AS 11/11.

POSSIBLE CALL BY HM AMBASSADOR, BAGHDAD, ON SD SADDAM HUSSEIN
AL-TIKRITI

1. As discussed with Mr Evans, I submit a draft telegram authorising Mr Balfour Paul to go ahead and seek an appointment, as he suggests in his letter of 28 October below.
2. The telegram proposes certain modifications to his suggested approach, and adds a piece on the stillborn IPC/Iraq Government autumn dialogue, which has been agreed with Mr Stockwell.
3. PUS/^{Oil,}and Arabian Departments, and Col Griffith (Personnel Operations Department) after consultation with the Ministry of Defence (DMSI), also agree.

S L Egerton
S L Egerton
Near Eastern Department

10 November 1971

Enc

You may wish to have
a word about this.

We discussed.

Redrafted

tel despatched

R. N. Evans
10 November 1971.

AS 11/11

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW 3/5/81
TOP COPY (49)

PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
FM FCO 111150Z
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(NED)

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO. 1198 OF 11/11 INFO MOSCOW TEHRAN
BAHRAIN RESY CAIRO WASHINGTON.

YOUR LETTER 3/4 OF 28 OCTOBER TO EVANS (WHICH WE ARE NOW COPYING
TO THE REPETITION ADDRESSEES OF THIS TELEGRAM):

SADDAM HUSSEIN.

1. IF THE SITUATION OVER THE GULF ISLANDS AND THE UNION HAD BEEN MORE CERTAIN AND LESS DELICATE THAN IT NOW IS, WE SHOULD HAVE SEEN ADVANTAGE IN YOUR ASKING FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN AND SPEAKING TO HIM ABOUT THE SUBJECTS MENTIONED IN PARA. 5 OF YOUR LETTER. BUT, GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE PREVAILING SITUATION, WE SHOULD PREFER YOU NOT TO DO THIS FOR THE TIME BEING. SIR WILLIAM LUCE IS ABOUT TO HAVE ANOTHER (VERY DIFFICULT) ROUND WITH THE SHAH. IT IS PRETTY CLEAR THAT THE IRAQIS ARE ENGAGED IN AN EXERCISE TO DRUM UP SUPPORT IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES FOR THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SITUATION IN THE GULF (YOUR TELNO. 1146): AND IT IS LIKELY THAT A GOOD DEAL WILL BE SAID ABOUT THE GULF AT THE MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS WHICH IS DUE TO BEGIN ON 13 NOVEMBER. IF YOU WERE TO ASK FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN (AND ESPECIALLY IF YOU WERE TO SAY THAT YOU HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DO THIS), HE WOULD PROBABLY CONCLUDE THAT YOU HAD SOME MESSAGE TO CONVEY ABOUT THE GULF. WHEN HE DISCOVERED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, HE WOULD BE ALL TOO LIKELY TO EMBARK ON A DIATRIBE ABOUT OUR POLICIES. THIS WOULD BE UNHELPFUL: AND WOULD CERTAINLY DEFEAT THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH YOU HAD SOUGHT THE APPOINTMENT IN THE FIRST PLACE.

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2. NONE OF THIS MEANS THAT WE ARE AGAINST THE IDEA OF YOUR SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE TIMING IS LIKELY TO BE A GOOD DEAL MORE PROPITIOUS AFTER THE TURN OF THE YEAR, BY WHEN THE PROBLEMS WE NOW FACE OVER THE GULF ISLANDS AND THE UNION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SETTLED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. YOUR RETURN FROM A MONTH'S LEAVE IN THIS COUNTRY COULD PERHAPS PROVIDE A CONVENIENT OCCASION FOR YOUR SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT

3. WE LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT WITH YOU WHEN YOU REACH LONDON.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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ARAB D	NEWS D
N AFR D	MOD TMR

50

11 November 1971

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

H.E. Mr. H.G. Balfour Paul CMG
British Embassy
Baghdad

- ① *Miss Bicket* ^{11/11}
copy taken.
② *Mr Chalmers*
③ *Mr Tullerton* } *oil*
 } *D.*
④ *for it's also (up spoke).*

I am sorry about our telegram No. 1198 which must have come as a disappointment to you. I take the full blame.

2. We all have great sympathy for your frustration at the dreaded "low profile" and we certainly have nothing in principle against your seeing Saddam Hussein. In fact I had actually initialled a telegram giving you instructions to see him and including some points to raise when I had second thoughts. It occurred to me that, with Bill Luce in Tehran on what must be virtually the last and probably the most difficult lap of the Islands race, with the Iraqis in the process of drumming up support for their views in the Arab world and with the Arab Foreign Ministers on the point of meeting in Cairo, Saddam would have been bound to associate a request by you for an interview with the Islands. He would have expected you to have something to say at this stage and it is impossible to see how we could give you any meaningful instructions in this sense until the situation becomes clearer. I thought that, if you had nothing to say to Saddam on the Islands - or rather nothing of substance - you would only be exposed to a diatribe from him which might make our problem even more awkward than it is now.

3. If by some miracle we get an agreement over Abu Musa and if it looks as though the Arab League are prepared to acquiesce in it and not to make too much of a fuss about the Tunbs, there might well be a case for your having a session with Saddam specifically on the Islands. We shall of course keep this in mind. If we fail and the balloon goes up, we shall be in a new situation and will have to consider what, if anything, we should do vis-à-vis the Iraqis.

4. Again, I am very sorry to add to your frustrations and we shall of course keep you closely in touch with what happens over the Islands problem. It will not be long before you will be able to give vent to your feelings with me face to face!

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5. Our discussion of the Gulf and the Islands followed what is now/familiar course. But I was amused by his insistence that we should not have supplied the Iranians with arms without attaching a condition that they should not be used against Arab territory: all arms sales, he said, had strings attached (but he declined to tell me what strings the Russians attached when selling arms to Iraq). He also pleaded for a "categorical statement" by HMG of their attitude on the Islands problem, to which I replied that categorical statements were unlikely to assist in the promotion of a solution acceptable to both sides.

6. On Oil Da'oud first spoke of the short-fall in Kirkuk throughput and revenue, and then raised the participation issue. I said it was not my business, nor was I qualified, to represent the oil companies; but he must be aware that during the price negotiations in May/June the Iraqi side had been warned that they might be pricing East Mediterranean oil out of the market. The world demand for Kirkuk oil was not a matter under the oil company's control. The latter could not be held responsible if, as a result of the price rise and other circumstances, demand had temporarily dropped off; anyway I understood it had returned to normal. On participation I said that my personal impression was that the shareholders' reaction to whatever proposals the Iraqi Government might put to them, might well depend on whether or not the Iraqis demonstrated that they were out to collaborate and not to harass. Recently the administrative harassment of IPC in the field had reached extraordinary proportions. Since he would shortly become an ex-officio director of IPC I suggested he ought to interest himself in this subject; and he undertook to seek an appointment with Bob Milne before leaving. I added that I had been sorry to learn that the Iraqis, despite the understanding reached earlier to hold talks in October with the shareholders' representatives on outstanding issues, seemed to have lost interest.

7. Da'oud then turned to economic and trade relations. As far as he was concerned, desiderata boiled down to Britain buying more Iraqi dates. I then told him of some of the difficulties which ~~the~~ British firms had been experiencing in their dealings with Iraq. Tender procedures and the award of contracts were one source of discouragement. Delayed payments were another. And the existence of certain unsettled commercial debts from long ago tended to give Iraq a bad name as a business partner. I gave him, by way of illustration, a summary of the Wimpey claim and said his life in London would be easier if he could secure the removal of this sort of handicap to improved commercial relations. I also drew his attention to our unanswered Notes to the Ministry on the proposed write-off of certain pre-war inter-governmental claims. Our proposals had been constructive and palpably in Iraq's interest: it was discouraging that they went unanswered. He promised to look



into it.

or reactionaries?

8. Da'oud then launched with greater enthusiasm into cultural affairs, which he said were now going very well. The Minister of Higher Education had been very pleased with her visit to England in July/August. The government were hoping that we could place hundreds of Iraqi students in British universities and supply dozens of British professors to Iraqi ones. They were eager for cooperation over scientific research. They wanted to arrange exchanges of high level visits.

9. I said that was all fine but there were two queries in my mind. Firstly, I found it difficult to reconcile what he had told me with President Bakr's repeated declarations that all "bourgeois and liberal influence" must be rooted out from Iraqi universities. (To this Da'oud lamely said that we should not take the President's remarks too literally. They had been aimed at a number of old-fashioned reactionaries causing trouble locally. The President was by no means opposed to educational and cultural cooperation with the West. Had he not sent his own son to Cambridge?) My second point related to the exchange of high level visits. I pointed out that we had gone to great trouble to invite the Iraqi Minister of Education and arrange a programme for him, but he had been dismissed on the eve of his departure. And our attempt last year to invite groups of province governors and departmental Directors General to England, had been submitted to his Ministry in the required manner and we had not even had the courtesy of a reply. We were trying again at this moment. I hoped that what he had told me of government policy meant that invitations offered of this kind would in future be accepted. I also told him that we had been doing what we could to help Iraq in the field of Technical Assistance, and described the long session we had just had on this subject with the Director General of Technical Affairs (reported elsewhere).

10. Da'oud then turned to press matters and exposed a flank by talking of Zionist control of the British press. I said the Israeli lobby was certainly well organised and active in the United Kingdom: it was up to the Arabs to present their case better. Opinions in the UK on the Arab/Israeli issue certainly differed. The British press and the BBC reflected these differences. I wished the same could be said of the Iraqi press and radio, whose monotonous out-pourings of abuse and denigration of my country were not only boring but hardly seemed compatible, since they were government controlled, with a desire to improve Anglo/Iraqi relations. At the end of our discussion on this subject I asked him how he explained the refusal yesterday of the government's Arabic daily even to accept for publication a notice sent by my Commercial Section relating to participation in next year's Baghdad Fair. He expressed amazement and asked for details.

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11. Finally I drew his attention to a number of issues in which I hoped he could use his good offices before his departure. They included such things as the licensing of our Embassy land-rovers, the disposal of our West Bank properties, facilities of various kinds for my Service Attachés, the question of our Vice Consulate in Basra and my continued lease of the IPC house. I needn't weary you with details here. Where necessary, we shall be reporting separately on them.

12. Incidentally, he still could not give me an ETD and admitted that he had not yet "had the pleasure" of being received by President Bakr to be given his parting instructions.

Yours ever

H G
H G Balfour Paul

P.S. Forgive the inelegance of this letter, dictated straight out to cable the Bag.

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H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

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FILE No. NEQ 3/548/1 (Part A (1-5))

TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ.

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Registry.		1/2	Registry.		18/3	Mr Evans		✓
V.D.	①	2/2	V.D.	⑩ ⑪	19/3	Registry.		16/1
Registry.		2/2	Registry.		23/3	V.D.	②3	14/6
A.A.A	①	8/2	V.D.	⑫ ⑬ ⑭		Registry.		17/1
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Registry.		2/3	Registry.		13/6	D.S.	③8	14/7
S.L.E.	Draft	✓	S.L.E.	⑲	7/6	Registry.		14/7
Mr. Evans	✓	✓	Registry.		7/6	V.D.	③8	14/7
Mr. Rennsch	✓	10/3	V.D.	(25-29)	8/6	V.D.	④0	30/5
Registry.		10/3	Registry.		8/6	V.D.	④1	1/11
J. L.T.B.		11/3	V.D.	③0	8/6	V.D.	④3	2/11
Defence Dept.	⑧	✓	Registry.		15/6	Registry Address		
Mr. Gurn		✓	V.D.	③1	15/6	Room No. 115		
						Downing Street (W)		
			Mr Gurn		✓			

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1971

Anglo-Iraq/Ba'ath Party Relations; British Arms Sales To Iraq And Iran. Political Relations Between Iraq And UK. 20 Jan. 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1539. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link. [gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107476967/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=fec68af8&pg=1](https://www.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107476967/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=fec68af8&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.